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Abstract
This thesis addresses the question of the authenticity of identity photographs, part of the
documents required in controlled access. Since sophisticated means of reproduction are
publicly available, new methods / techniques should prevent tampering and unauthorized
reproduction of the photograph.
This thesis proposes a hashing method for the authentication of the identity pho-
tographs, robust to print-and-scan. This study focuses also on the effects of digitization
at hash level. The developed algorithm performs a dimension reduction, based on in-
dependent component analysis (ICA). In the learning stage, the subspace projection is
obtained by applying ICA and then reduced according to an original entropic selection
strategy. In the extraction stage, the coefficients obtained after projecting the identity
image on the subspace are quantified and binarized to obtain the hash value.
The study reveals the effects of the scanning noise on the hash values of the identity
photographs and shows that the proposed method is robust to the print-and-scan attack.
The approach focusing on robust hashing of a restricted class of images (identity) differs
from classical approaches that address any image.
Résume
Cette thèse traite de la question de l’authenticité des photographies d’identité, partie
intégrante des documents nécessaires lors d’un contrôle d’accès. Alors que les moyens
de reproduction sophistiqués sont accessibles au grand public, de nouvelles méthodes /
techniques doivent empêcher toute falsification / reproduction non autorisée de la pho-
tographie d’identité.
Cette thèse propose une méthode de hachage pour l’authentification de photographies
d’identité, robuste à l’impression-lecture. Ce travail met ainsi l’accent sur les effets de la
numérisation au niveau de hachage. L’algorithme mis au point procède à une réduction
de dimension, basée sur l’analyse en composantes indépendantes (ICA). Dans la phase
d’apprentissage, le sous-espace de projection est obtenu en appliquant l’ICA puis réduit
selon une stratégie de sélection entropique originale. Dans l’étape d’extraction, les coeffi-
cients obtenus après projection de l’image d’identité sur le sous-espace sont quantifiés et
binarisés pour obtenir la valeur de hachage.
L’étude révèle les effets du bruit de balayage intervenant lors de la numérisation des
photographies d’identité sur les valeurs de hachage et montre que la méthode proposée
est robuste à l’attaque d’impression-lecture. L’approche suivie en se focalisant sur le
hachage robuste d’une classe restreinte d’images (d’identité) se distingue des approches
v
classiques qui adressent une image quelconque.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Problem statement
Due to the increase of digital technologies, person’s authentication is demanded in more
and more situations such as transactions, voting, border crossing etc. Nowadays, world-
wide users have access to powerful software and to high–quality technologies such as
cameras, scanners and printers, which allow them to easily edit and reproduce identity
document (ID). Thus the need for ownership protection and prevention of unauthorized
modifications of ID documents is highly required.
Traditional methods like knowledge–based passwords or token–based cards are still
employed in authentication but identity documents are preferred because various fea-
tures can be inserted in order to increase security and to limit forgery. For images, new
techniques for authentication such as watermarking and perceptual hashing have been
proposed. Watermarking is a popular method in image/document authentication, which
has made substantial progress in the past few years. It consists in embedding informa-
tion, called watermark, into the content of the image, information which can be further
used to verify the data’s authenticity. Robust hashing is a viable alternative to digital
watermarking which maps the multimedia data to a compact representation (called label,
fingerprint, hash value or digital signature) of it. The main difference between the two
methods is that the latter is always content–dependent.
Since most of the ID documents contain the photograph of the holder, in this thesis I
focused my attention on ID image forgery and I have proposed to use perceptual image
hashing as an image authentication technique. My contribution consists in implementing
a robust face hashing algorithm which may be used in access control, border control,
visas issuance department etc. For example, in access control, a person must first identify
himself before being allowed to enter the secured area (school, concert, work places). This
can be done through an access card which contains various information of the person like
user’s photo, name, an embedded hash value of the photo etc. The person will be allowed
to enter only if he passes the security check. This consists in scanning the photo printed
on the card, extract its hash value and compare it with the one embedded in the card.
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1.2 Approach
Most of the existing image hashing algorithms have been developed for a wide class of
images. The ID picture is a particular case of image with special features that should
be taken into account when designing a hash algorithm. The proposed technique for
extracting the hash value of an ID picture is a learning–based approach that takes into
consideration the characteristics of the face, such as eyes, mouth, nose etc. In the learning
process, the ICA is performed in order to obtain a projection subspace consisting in a
series of face features. Each scanned ID photo is projected onto the learned subspace
and the projection coefficients are retained. The hash value associated to the photo is
the vector of the quantized and binarized coefficients.
1.3 Outline
This thesis focuses on extracting a hash value from ID photographs so that the hash
value should be invariant under perceptually insignificant modifications on the image
and sensitive to malicious manipulations on the image.
Chapter 2 presents a framework for image hashing. The desired properties of a per-
ceptual hash are defined and the main challenges in finding good trade–offs between
these proprieties are identified. The previous work made in image hashing is reviewed.
Early methods, that achieve robustness for perceptually insignificant attacks, are usually
insecure. Recently developed methods, based on dimension reduction, have shown to
outperform the previous techniques.
Chapter 3 provides an introduction to the concept of ICA. ICA is presented as a case
of Principal Component Analysis (PCA), which provides an independent rather than
uncorrelated image decomposition. Various algorithms employed to obtain independence
are described
Chapter 4 develops a scheme for ID photograph authentication based on two types of
ICA representation. The first representation is more pertinent. An image is defined as
a linear combination of face features rather than a linear combination of faces. Several
algorithms for face features selection are further developed and can be combined to obtain
a better performance.
Chapter 5 describes the print–and–scan process. The printing and scanning devices
are characterized for a better understanding of the physical phenomena that occur in this
complex process. The effects caused by printing and scanning an image are identified.
Countermeasures to these effects and statistical models for the print–and–scan noise are
also presented.
Chapter 6 develops a model for the scan noise that affects the printed ID photograph
in the authentication process. The two main noises and their effects are analyzed both
at image and hash level. It is shown that the noise is content–dependent and that the
algorithms for face features selection proposed in chapter 5 allow to reduction of the scan
noise influence on the hash.
2
1.3. OUTLINE
Chapter 7 concludes the thesis by summarizing the contributions and presents direc-
tions for future work.
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Chapter 2
State of art in image hashing
2.1 Introduction
This chapter presents a unifying framework of image hashing. Section 2.2 highlights the
place of image hashing in the multimedia data authentication context. It also shows the
two main applications of image hashing, image authentication and indexation. Next, the
desired properties of a perceptual image hash are given.
Section 2.3 reviews the work in this domain and at the end the approach proposed in
this thesis is briefly described. Section 2.4 summarizes the main ideas presented in this
chapter.
2.2 Image hashing in multimedia data authentication
and archiving
The evolution of digital technology during the past few decades has led to significant
changes in the modern society. Along with powerful tools, new devices, such as high
quality digital cameras, scanners and printers, have reached users worldwide. They allow
to create, edit and reproduce audio sequences, images, videos and documents. In this
context, the protection of ownership and the prevention of unauthorized tampering have
become significant concerns [Cox 2002, Wu 2002].
In order to verify the reliability of the multimedia data, several authentication meth-
ods have been developed. A solution is the use of conventional cryptographic hashes
as Message Digest 5 (MD5) [Rivest 1992] or Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) [NIST 2008]
which are deeply perceptive even to a single bit change in the input data. Thus, the data
integrity can be verified when every bit is unaffected. But, in the case of multimedia, data
cryptographic hashes are no longer suitable. The multimedia data can exist in different
digital forms and is still considered authentic even after non–malicious attacks like JPEG
compression or print–and–scan attacks in the case of images. This is the reason why hash
algorithms that are content–dependent and tolerate content–preserving distortion (same
or similar content lead to same hash, while different content lead to drastically changes
in the hash) were developed. These hashes must take into consideration the changes in
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the visual/audio domain and retain only the most significant perceptual attributes of the
media. Therefore, a multimedia hash is defined as a content–based digital signature of
the media data. In literature it is also called label or fingerprint.
Many multimedia hash functions have been developed for media authentication. They
can be divided into two main categories: unkeyed hash functions and keyed hash functions.
The unkeyed hash functions generate the multimedia hash from an arbitrary input while
keyed hash functions need an arbitrary input and a secret key.
In media authentication, the keyed hash functions are utilized. In an authentication
system like the one in Fig. 2.1, the hash function extracts certain characteristics from
the data that are further encrypted by using a secret key. The hash is sent along with
the media either by appending or embedding it to the original data. At the receiver, the
hash value is computed and confronted with the one transmitted along with the data, in
order to verify its authenticity.
Figure 2.1: Image authentication with keyed hash function.
Beside digital signature–based algorithms [Venkatesan 2000, Mihçak 2001]
[Kailasanathan 2001, Martinian 2002], another method widely used for media authen-
tication is watermarking [Cox 1997, Lin 1999b, Yeung 1997, Wu 1998, Wolfgang 1999,
Xie 2001]. Watermarking is defined as the process of inserting invisible (or inaudible)
data into the media (Fig. 2.2). In authentication applications, the embedded watermark
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is retrieved at the receiver side in order to take a decision on the authenticity of the
media.
The major difference between a watermark and a hash is that the latter is content–
dependent while the former is not. In the first case, the watermark integrity is verified,
while in the second case it is the image content. Nevertheless, both the watermark–based
approach and the digital signature–based approach for media content authentication are
required to be perceptive to any malicious attack such as attacks against the key, inten-
tional replacement of pixel values, forging the original image in order to claim multiple
identities. At the same time they should remain robust to non–intentional modifications
such as JPEG compression (with compression ratios that do not alter significantly the
perceptual quality of the media) or print–and–scan attacks.
Figure 2.2: Media authentication methods: a) image hashing; b) invisible watermarking.
Another important application for multimedia hashing is content–based retrieval from
databases [Lin 2001]. Simple methods for image search in databases such as sample–by–
sample comparisons are computationally inefficient. Because these methods compare
the lowest level of content representation they are not robust to attacks such as ge-
ometric distortions. Robust image hash functions can be used to address this prob-
lem [Venkatesan 2000]. For each image entry in the database a hash is computed and
stored with the original image in the form of a lookup table. To search for a given image
in the database, its hash is computed and compared with the hashes in the lookup table.
The data entry corresponding to the closest match, in terms of certain hash–domain dis-
tance, is then fetched. Since the hash has a much smaller size than the original image,
matching the hash values is computationally more efficient than the sample–by–sample
comparison.
Image hash functions have also been employed in some other applications such as
image and video watermarking and information embedding. In image watermarking, in-
stead of inserting a mark which is independent of the content of the image, the hash
of the image can be computed and embedded (Fig. 2.3). The hash functions can also
be employed as image–dependent keys for watermarking [Holliman 1999]. In video wa-
termarking, if the attacker has in possession multiple copies of similar frames, he can
deduce the watermark by using “collusion attacks” [Su 2005]. A proposed solution to this
problem is to generate the watermark using a secure, content–dependent hash value as a
7
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Figure 2.3: Watermarking with image hash embedding.
key generator [Fridrich 2000].
When designing a robust image hash algorithm, the following constraints must be
taken into consideration:
• robustness refers to the ability of the hash to produce equivalent hashes for input
images that differ by a certain distortion level. An acceptable distortion level should
take into account some non–malicious attacks;
• security consists in introducing a secret key when generating the hash value. With-
out the knowledge of this key the hash values cannot be forged;
In indexing applications, additional constraints must be taken into consideration. For
example, the hash length has to be as small as possible in order to guarantee fast search
in the hash database and in the same time, the hash length has to be as large as possible
to satisfy scalability requirements.
2.2.1 A typical scheme for robust image hashing
In order to attain robustness and security, almost all hashing schemes are three–step pro-
cesses. A typical hashing scheme is presented in Fig. 2.4. First, perceptually significant
features are extracted from the content, then quantized and compressed to a short binary
string. For content authentication, the hash is encrypted.
In practice, the hash value does not remain exactly the same, it slightly changes
because of non–malicious attacks. Therefore, the hash comparison is usually a hypothesis
testing problem: a similarity measure between the received hash and the computed one is
calculated and compared with a threshold; if it is below the threshold, the tested version
is considered as authentic, otherwise as inauthentic.
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Figure 2.4: A typically hashing scheme.
2.2.2 The properties of an ideal hash
Let I be the image to be hashed. The hash function takes the image I and a secret key
K in order to produce an n–bit hash h = H(I,K).
An ideal hash must have the following properties:
1) Perceptual robustness : for any pair of two perceptually similar images, the hashes
should map to the same value (Fig. 2.5).
P (H(I,K) = H(Iident, K)) = 1 (2.1)
where P denotes the probability, and I and Iident, the original, respectively the
perceptually identical image.
(a) Original image (b) JPEG compression
image
Figure 2.5: Two perceptually identical images.
2) Sensitivity : two perceptual distinct images (images of different persons or original
and tampered image) must lead to different hash values (Fig. 2.6).
P (H(I,K) 6= H(Idif , K)) = 1 (2.2)
where I and Idif , represent the original, respectively the different/tampered image.
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(a) Original image (b) Tampered image (c) Different person
Figure 2.6: a) Original and tampered image; b) Different image.
3) Unpredictability of the hash consists in having an approximatively uniform distribution
of the hash
P (H(I,K) = v) ≈ 1
2q
, v ∈ {0, 1}q (2.3)
where v is the hash value extracted from I and q ∈ N .
There is a trade–off between robustness and sensitivity. The first property requires
robustness under small distortions while the second imposes minimal collision probability
for different hashes. The last two properties are important from the security point of view,
i.e. it should be very difficult for an attacker to forge the content of an image and obtain
the same hash value as for the original image.
2.3 Review of image hashing algorithms
This section reviews the research which has been done so far in image hashing. The
approaches can be classified into methods based on image statistics [Schneider 1996,
Kailasanathan 2001, Venkatesan 2000], pixel/coefficient relations [Lin 1997, Lu 2000], preser-
vation of coarse image representation [Fridrich 2000, Mihçak 2001] low–level image fea-
ture extraction [Bhattacharjee 1998, Dittmann 1999] and dimension reduction techiniques
[Kozat 2004].
2.3.1 Image Statistics Based Approaches
In one of the first approaches, Schneider et al. [Schneider 1996] use intensity histograms of
image blocks for media authentication. The authentication process consists in computing
the Euclidean distance between the histogram of the authentic image and the candidate
image. The authors use as authenticity measure the sum of all Euclidean distances over
the image.
In [Kailasanathan 2001], three methods for image authentication that survive to con-
tent adjustments by JPEG compression have been described.
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Method 1
This method uses mean and standard deviation for generating the hash value. The
statistical values that capture the significant features of an image and remain basically
unchanged through JPEG compression are obtained from the original image Io and all
the JPEG compressed versions of image Io (down to a tolerated quality factor σ), denoted
Im.
The hash vector is generated as follows:
Step 1 The image Io and each JPEG compressed version Im are divided into m x n
rectangular blocks of size a x b;
Step 2 For each square block, the mean/standard deviations Soij and Smij (i = 1, ...,m
and j = 1, ..., n) are computed;
Step 3 A threshold Tσ is computed :
Tσ = max
i,j,m
|Soij − Smij | (2.4)
The final hash vector contains the series of statistics of the original blocks Soij, the
block dimension a x b, the type of statistics utilized and the threshold Tσ. The length of
the hash vector will be given by the block size.
In the verification stage, for a candidate image Ic, the statistics Scij are computed by
performing steps 1) and 2) . The candidate image Ic is considered authentic if |Soij−Scij| ≤
Tσ.
Method 2
In this method, instead of the fixed sized blocks, the authors use images obtained by
k–means clustering for hash generation and verification.
The steps in generating the hash vector can be summarized as follows:
Step 1 The image Io and each modified version Im are divided into P regions by using
the k–means algorithm. The pixel features used by k–means are the pixel value,
the mean and standard deviation of adjacent pixels [Kailasanathan 2001]. The code
book provided by k–means is included in the hash value;
Step 2 For each region i = 1, ..., P , Soi and Smi are computed;
Step 3 The threshold T is determined based on the value Dm as in equation 2.6. The
value Dm of the Euclidean distance between the standard deviation of the original
image regions Soi and the modified image regions Smi is:
Dm =
√√√√ P∑
i=1
((Soi )− (Smi ))2 (2.5)
T = maxm(Dm) (2.6)
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The hash consists of the sequence of original image regions statistics Soi , the number
of regions P, the type of statistics, the code book and the threshold T.
In the verification stage, the candidate image Ic is divided into P regions by using
k–means algorithm and the code book. Then, the standard deviations Sci of these regions
are computed. The candidate image is considered authentic if the difference Dc ≤ T .
Method 3
In this method, the P regions are obtained by vector quantization with Linde–Buzo–
Gray (LBG) algorithm.The feature vectors are the same as in method 2 i.e. the pixel
value, mean of adjacent pixels and standard deviation of adjacent pixels.
The hash generation can be resumed as follows:
Step 1 : Take the original image Io and obtain m images by compressing it for m
different JPEG quality factors;
Step 2 : For all the above images the feature vectors Tci are obtained. The training set
from the LBG algorithm consists in Tc = Tc1UTc2U...UTcm ;
Step 3 Train the codebook on the Tc obtained only from the compressed images fea-
ture vectors. Let FC = {C1, C2, ..., Cp} be the codebook and p is the size of the
codebook;
Step 4 : Starting with the codebook FC created above make one more iteration on LBG
algorithm using as training set Tci . Let FC ′ = {C ′1, C ′2, ..., C ′p} be the codebook after
one iteration;
Step 5 : Determine a range [a, b] of acceptable Euclidean distances by looking at the
minimum and maximum values of EDcomp.
The hash is obtained by concatenating FC, a and b. The length of the hash is ((p x
3)+2)x r bytes, where r is the number of bytes employed to represent a real number.
In the verification stage, for a candidate image Ic,the sequence of the feature vectors
is computed. Assuming FCr is the codebook obtained after one more iteration of LBG
algorithm, the deviation caused in Euclidean distance is determined as EDreceived =√∑p
i=1 (Ci − Cri )2. The candidate image is considered authentic if EDreceived ∈ [a, b].
In [Venkatesan 2000], a hash algorithm based on image statistics extracted from dif-
ferent Wavelet Transform (WT) sub–bands is proposed. It is a keyed–hash algorithm
that gets as inputs the image to be hashed and a secret key K. The key K is employed
as a seed for the pseudorandom number generator employed during several stages of the
proposed method.
The main steps of Venkatesan et al. algorithms can be summarized as follows:
Step 1 Random tiling transform by using K and statistics calculation: after image
wavelet decomposition, each sub–band is randomly tiled into smaller rectangles
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Figure 2.7: Venkatesan hash algorithm
(Fig. 2.7). Next, an image statistics vector m is computed. m is a vector con-
sisting in the mean of coarse sub–band coefficients and the variances of the other
sub–bands coefficients;
Step 2 Randomized rounding : in this stage the robustness against attacks is increased
by quantizing the vector m. The authors consider that the inputs are generated
by unknown sources and utilize randomized rounding as an essential source of ran-
domness. The key K from the previous step is used here to obtain the distribution
used for quantization. The length of quantized vector x will be three times longer
since each value is represented on three bits;
Step 3 Reed–Muler decoding : decoding is necessary for stabilizing the hash value. A
first–order Reed–Muller error-correcting decoder is employed to obtain the binary
hash from the binary vector x [Blahut 1994]. The exponential pseudo norm metric
is used in the decoding scheme;
Step 4 Supplementary decoding : The final hash value may be mapped to a shorter string;
In the verification stage, the hash value of a candidate image Ic, computed as above,
is compared with the hash value of the original image by using the normalized Hamming
distance.
2.3.2 Image Relations Based Approaches
Relation–based methods consist in constituting suitable image hash values based on a
transform domain representation of the image, such as Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT)
or WT. In these approaches, invariant relationships between the transform coefficients
are identified. Lin and Chang report in [Lin 1997] a relation–based approach for image
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authentication, tolerant to JPEG compression. They take into consideration the rela-
tionship between any two DCT coefficients placed at the same position in two distinct 8
x 8 blocks.
In JPEG compression, the DCT coefficients quantization and rounding are lossy op-
erations. The authors propose a scheme for generating robust feature vectors that are
not affected by these lossy operations. They prove that robust feature vectors can be
obtained if all the following properties are valid:
a) if ∆Fp,q(v) > 0, then ∆ ¯Fp,q(v) > 0;
b) else if ∆Fp,q < 0, then ∆ ¯Fp,q(v) ≤ 0;
c) else ∆Fp,q = 0, then ∆ ¯Fp,q(v) = 0;
where ∆Fp,q = Fp − Fq and ∆ ¯Fp,q = F¯p − F¯q. Fp and Fq, respectively F¯p and F¯q, are the
DCT coefficients of two 8 x 8 blocks of the original image, respectively their quantized
approximation.
In other words, the relationship between Fp and Fq is affected by the quantization
process only when, because of rounding, greater than or less than relationships become
equal.
As illustrated in Fig. 2.8 the hash is generated by encrypting the extracted feature
vectors Z. The feature extraction process consists in generating sets of feature codes
from N DCT blocks. Then the difference ∆Fp,q from the 8 x 8 DCT blocks is computed.
If ∆Fp,q ≤ k, where k is a user–defined threshold, a feature cod bit of “0” is added, else
a “1” is added;
In the encryption stage, in order to enforce robustness, some additional information
is added (the mean of DCT coefficients in each 8 x 8 block position) for obtaining the
hash S.
The authentication process is a three–parts process. First, DCT is performed on
the received (raw or JPEG compressed) image. In the case of the compressed image, an
entropy decoder and de–quantizer are also used. Secondly, the hash vector S is decrypted
and then sent to the authentication comparator. The comparator will decide if the image
is authentic or not by checking the mean values in each position of the DCT coefficients
in the original, respectively the tested image.
Even if this approach is robust to JPEG compression, it is still sensitive to other
perceptually minor modifications like cropping and shifting.
In multi–resolution wavelet analysis a certain number of parent–child pairs < p, c >
exists. Lu et al. represent them in [Lu 2000] under the form of an image called structural
digital signature (SDS). The generation of the SDS is done by observing the inter–scale
relations of the image wavelet coefficients. The proposed method is based on the following
assumptions:
• the inter–scale relationships of the Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT) coefficients
should be preserved if content–preserving manipulations are made on the image;
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Figure 2.8: Media authentication scheme proposed by Lin and Chang [Lin 1997].
• this inter–scale relationship should be difficult to be preserved after content–changing
manipulations.
Let ws,o(x, y) be a wavelet coefficient at scale s, orientation o and position (x, y) of
image I. The SDS of image I contains a sequence of parent–child pairs that satisfies:
||ws+1,o(x, y)| − |ws,o(2x+ i, 2y + j)|| ≥ σ (σ ≥ 0) (2.7)
where σ determines the number of parent–child pairs. The greater σ is, the smaller the
number of pairs in the SDS. Depending on the type of relationship the pairs carry, a
symbol is assigned to each of them. The above considered symbols and their position
in the wavelet domain are coded by a public key algorithm such as the Rivest, Shamir,
15
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Adleman (RSA) method [Menezes 1996], stored and employed later in image authentica-
tion.
Figure 2.9: Media authentication scheme proposed by Lu et al. [Lu 2000].
In the authentication process (decribed in Fig. 2.9), the similarity degree between the
original I and the candidate I¯ image is defined as:
SIM(SDS(I), SDS(I¯)) =
N+ −N−
|SDS(I)| (2.8)
where |SDS(I)| denotes the number of parent–child pairs, N+ the number of pairs which
satisfy 2.9 and N− the number of pairs which do not satisfy 2.9.
sym(< p, c >) = sym(< p¯, c¯ >) (2.9)
where sym(< p, c >) represents the signature symbol of the parent–child pair and < p¯, c¯ >
in I¯ is the corresponding pair of < p, c > in I. The signature symbol is extracted from
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the DCT pairs whter p is larger than c or not. If the SIM(SDS(I), SDS(I¯)) value is
greater than a threshold, the image is considered authentic. In the case of incidental
attacks, the SDS of the candidate image is not significantly affected while in the case of
malicious attacks it will be significantly destroyed.
2.3.3 Approaches based on coarse image representations
In [Fridrich 2000] a robust, key–dependent, hash function for digital watermarking is
proposed. The main idea of the method is derived from the observation that large values of
low–frequency DCT coefficients will automatically lead to significant perceptual changes
to the image.
The procedure of hash generation is randomized by replacing the DCT modes with
random smooth patterns made DC–free by mean extraction. The random smooth pat-
terns P are obtained by applying a low–pass filter to N sub–unitary random matrices,
generated by using a secret key K. Each image I is divided into image blocks of 64x64
pixels. The image blocks B are then projected on the space produced by the N patterns
P. Their absolute value is computed and compared with the threshold Th in order to
obtain N bits bi:
if |B · P (i) ≤ Th| then bi = 0
if |B · P (i) ≥ Th| then bi = 1 (2.10)
where i = 1, ..., N .
The projections are independent of the mean gray value of the block, but are image–
dependent. The N bits sequence order should be adjusted so that half of the bi bits have
zero value and the other half one value, in order to provide maximum information.
The hash value contains the N bits extracted as presented above. The method is
resistant to attacks like JPEG compression, additive uniform noise, sharpening, blurring,
median, and mosaic filtering etc., but sensitive to geometric attacks, such as rotation,
shifingt and change of scale.
Mihcak proposes in [Mihçak 2001] a two–step algorithm for obtaining the hash of an
image:
• generation of intermediate hash value;
• generation of final hash value by applying a randomized lattice vector quantization
to obtain the final hash vector;
The authors propose two algorithms:
Algorithm A
In this approach the significant regions of the discrete WT are retained. An iterative
filtering technique is employed in order to minimize the geometrically weak components
and improve the geometrically strong components. The filtering is based on region grow-
ing. This means that the blocks with isolated important components (geometrically weak)
17
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are viable candidates to be erased via modifications, while blocks which have massive clus-
ters of important components (geometrically strong) would probably not be erased but
only a bit perturbed.
Here are the steps for generating the hash:
Step 1 For a given image I, find the WT up to level L. Let IA be the resulting approxi-
mation sub–band.
Step 2 A binary map M is obtained from IA by performing the following thresholding
operation:
M(i, j) =
{
1 if IA ≥ T
0 otherwise
where T is selected so that the normalized Hamming weight of the binary input M
should be approximatively q, where q is a sub–unitary number;
Step 3 Geometric region growing. Let M1 = M and ctr = 1;
Step 3.1. Determine M2 by applying an order-statistics filter on M1;
Step 3.2. Let M3 = AM2, where A is an algorithm parameter. M4 is obtained by
a 2–dimensional linear shift–invariant filtering on M3.
Step 3.3. A binary map M5 is obtained by performing a thresholding operation
on M4 similar to the one described in step 2.
Step 3.4. The geometric region growing stops if ctr ≥ C. If it is not the case,
increment ctr and restart geometric region growing for M1 = M5.
Step 4 The image hash M5.
In this approach, there is no pseudo–randomness, because no key is used. Since
randomness is important for security, Algorithm B was developed.
Algorithm B
In this approach, the authors apply Algorithm A on randomly chosen blocks of the
image or its wavelet transform. Random rectangles are utilized for this purpose.
Hash generation:
Step 1 Divide image I in N rectangles Ri of size wi x hi. Let Ii be the sub–image
obtained by overlapping rectangle Ri on image I, i = 1, ..., N ;
Step 2 Obtain a hash matrix H(Ii) of Ii by applying Algorithm A;
Step 3 Each hash matrix is converted into a vector by randomly ordering the matrix’s
elements. Concatenate all the vectors in order to obtain a hash;
Step 4 The final hash is obtained by randomly selecting Mˆ bits from the vector obtained
in the previous step;
18
2.3. REVIEW OF IMAGE HASHING ALGORITHMS
In the verification stage, the normalized Hamming distance is used to compare the
hashes of the original and candidate images. The candidate image is authentic if the
normalized Hamming distance is smaller than a predefined threshold.
The two algorithms proved to be robust to non–malicious geometric attacks except
large rotation and cropping.
2.3.4 Low–level Image Feature Extraction
In [Bhattacharjee 1998] Bhattacharjee et al. propose a method that extracts features
inherent to the image.
The hash generation is a two–step procedure as in common cryptographic authenti-
cation schemes:
• Feature extraction: the feature points are extracted by using Mexican Hat wavelets
which have been shown to be more stable and also less complex than other filters.
The features points are given by their coordinates;
• encryption: the sequence of feature points is encrypted by using a public key algo-
rithm such as RSA.
The feature points extraction has three steps:
a) The feature detection function is defined as:
Pij(~x) = |Mi(~x)− λ ·Mj(~x)| (2.11)
where Mi(~x) and Mj(~x) are the responses of the Mexican Hat wavelet at image
position ~x for scales i and j.
b) The set of potential feature points is given by the local maxima of function Pij. The
authors use a circular neighborhood with a 5 pixels radius for obtaining the local
maxima;
c) A point of local maxima is accepted as feature point if the variance of the pixels
situated in the point neighborhood has a value higher than a predefined threshold.
A 7 x 7 neighborhood area is used for local variance computation. The threshold
value is 10;
In the verification stage for a candidate image Ic the set of feature points Sc is extracted
and compared with the set of feature points of the original image,So. Ic is considered
authentic if each feature point location obtained from So, is present in Sc and if no feature
location present in So is absent in Sc.
In [Dittmann 1999], Dittmann and colleagues develop a feature extraction scheme
based on the edge characteristics of an image. The edge characteristics are a good indi-
cator of image content, allowing the recognition of the object form and the homogeneity
of the image.
The edge–based hash of an image I is obtained in [Dittmann 1999] as follows:
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Step 1 : The edge characteristic of I is extracted by using the Canny edge detector;
Step 2 : A binary edge pattern is obtained from the edge characteristic;
Step 3 : The feature code is obtained by applying a Variable Length Code (VLC) to
the binary edge pattern;
Step 4 : The hash is obtained from the feature code;
In the authentication process for a candidate image Ic the edge pattern is computed
from the extracted edge characteristic and compared with the one extracted from the
original image.
The approach proved to be robust to significant content–preserving attacks like trans-
mission errors, noise, data storage errors, brightening reduction, resolution reduction,γ
distortion, changes of hue and saturation, but it is sensitive to several perceptually in-
significant changes like compression, quantization and scaling.
Monga et al. propose in [Monga 2006] an algorithm using feature extraction based
on wavelets. They develop their own feature detector based on wavelets and an adaptive
quantization scheme which is based on the distribution of the extracted features. They
give two versions of the algorithm, a deterministic algorithm and a randomized algorithm.
The proposed feature detection method consists in three steps. First, the wavelet
transform for each image location is computed. The wavelet transform is based on end–
stopped wavelets. Second, the significant features are selected by looking for a local
maxima of the magnitude of the wavelet coefficients in a neighborhood. Next, a pre–
defined threshold is used to eliminate fake local maxima in featureless zones of the image.
Deterministic Algorithm
The authors adapt the algorithm presented in [Mihçak 2001] to lock onto a set of
feature–points conserved in visually similar images.
The intermediate hash is obtained as follows:
Step 1 : For an image I, extract the feature vector f by using the proposed feature
detector described above;
Step 2 : Quantize f in order to obtain the binary vector b1f ;
Step 3 : Perform order–statistics filtering on I in order to eliminate important compo-
nents. Let IOS be the filtering result;
Step 4 : Perform low–pass filtering on IOS in order to retain strong components. Let
Ilp be the result;
Step 5 : Repeat steps [1] and [2] for Ilp in order to get b2f ;
Step 6 : If the Hamming distance between b1f and b2f is smaller than a pre–defined value,
the hash takes the value of the variable b2f , otherwise the algorithm is reapplied for
I = Ilp;
20
2.3. REVIEW OF IMAGE HASHING ALGORITHMS
Randomized Algorithm
The first algorithm proposed in [Monga 2006] does not use a secret key. For improv-
ing the security and also scalability of the hash algorithm a randomized version of the
algorithm is described below. The approach makes use of a secret key K as a seed for a
pseudo–random generator employed in different stages of the algorithm.
Step 1 : Random Partitioning: divide the image into overlapping circular/elliptical
regions with randomly selected radii. The N regions are labeled as Ci, i = 1,...,N;
Step 2 : Rectangularization: each Ci is approximated by random rectangles, Ri;
Step 3 : Feature Extraction: extract the binary string bi by applying the deterministic
algorithm on all Ri and then concatenate all binary strings into a binary vector b;
Step 4 : Randomized Subspace Projection: randomly choose distinct indices i1, i2, ..., iA
so that each im ∈ [1, B], m = 1, 2, ..., A. A and B represent the desired length of
the hash and, respectively, the hash vector length after step [3];
Step 5 : The intermediate hash is h(I,K) = {bi1 , bi2 , ..., biA}
In order to detect if a candidate image is authentic, the hash value from the original
and the candidate image are compared by means of Hamming distance. The algorithm
proved to be robust to visually insignificant attacks like JPEG compression, contrast en-
hancement, Gaussian smoothing, rotation with an angle smaller than 5o, scaling, shearing,
cropping less than 20% and sensitive to content–based attacks like significant changes in
image geometry.
2.3.5 Other approaches
2.3.5.1 Dimension reduction techniques
Recently, various dimension reduction–based hashing techniques have been developed.
The hashing algorithm proposed in [Kozat 2004] is a two–step algorithm. First, the
intermediate features are derived from pseudo–random (PR) regions via matrix invariants
such as Singular Value Decomposition (SVD). Next, a PR secondary image is constructed
from the intermediate features, which is further employed for extracting the final hash
vector of the image.
Let I be the input image of dimension n x n. The generic hashing scheme consists in
the following steps:
Step 1 : From I generate p PR overlapping rectangles Ai of dimension m x m, i =
1, ..., p;
Step 2 : From each rectangle Ai generate the feature vector ~gi. ~gi = T1(Ai), where T1
is one of the following transforms: SVD, DCT, DWT;
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Step 3 : Build a secondary image J from a PR combination of intermediate feature
vectors {~g1, ..., ~gp}
Step 4 : From image J generate r PR overlapping rectangles Bi of dimension d x d,
i = 1, ..., r;
Step 5 : From each rectangle Bi generate a final feature vector fi. fi = T2(Bi), where
T2 is the SVD transform;
Step 6 : Combine the final feature vectors fi in order to obtain the final hash vector;
The performance of the algorithm is influenced by the choice of transformations T1
and T2. The hash methods obtained by combining T1 and T2 proved to be robust under
severe geometric distortions.
The results obtained in [Kozat 2004] motivated researchers to find alternative so-
lutions in this direction. Monga and colleagues propose in [Monga 2007] a hashing
algorithm based on a dimension reduction technique developed by Lee et al. called
nonnegative matrix factorization (NMF) [Lee 2001].
Using NMF algorithm, a matrix V of size m x n is factorized in the following way:
V ≈ WH (2.12)
where W ∈ Rmxr and H ∈ Rrxn.
The NMF–NMF hashing algorithm proposed by Monga et al. has similar structure
with the one proposed in [Kozat 2004]. The steps of the algorithm are summarized below:
Step 1 : For a given image I, generate p subimages Ai with dimensionm xm, i = 1, ..., p;
Step 2 : For each subimage Ai obtain the matrices Wi and Fi by applying NMF:
Ai ≈ WiF Ti (2.13)
Step 3 : By pseudo–randomly combining matrices Wi and Fi a secondary image J is
constructed ;
Step 4 : Reapply NMF on image J in order to obtain matrices W and H:
J ≈ WH (2.14)
Step 5 : The columns of matrix W and the rows of matrix H are concatenated in order
to obtain the hash vector;
All the steps in the algorithm are randomized by using a secret key.
A second hash algorithm, called NMF–NMF–SQ, is proposed in [Monga 2007]. The
algorithm, based on obtaining pseudorandom statistics of the NMF–NMF hash, can be
summarized as follows:
Step 1 : For an image I obtain the hash vector hNMF−NMF (I) by applying NMF–NMF
algorithm;
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Step 2 : Pseudorandom weight vectors {ti}Mi=1 are generated, where M is the length
of the final hash. The final hash vector is given by {< hNMF−NMF (I), t1 >, ..., <
hNMF−NMF (I), tM >}, where < x, y > denotes the inner product of vectors x and
y;
In the verification stage, the comparison of the hash vectors obtained for the original
and the candidate image is done based on the L2 norm between the two hashes.
The NMF hashing method possesses excellent robustness under a large class of per-
ceptually insignificant attacks like JPEG compression, shearing, γ correction, cropping,
rotation, affine wrapping while reducing misclassification rate for perceptually different
images.
Inspired by the promising results obtained using dimension reduction techniques, Lv
et colleagues propose in [Lv 2009] a new robust and secure image hashing scheme based
on Fast Johnson–Lindenstrauss Transform (FJLT). By using the FJLT, n points from
the Euclidean space can be projected from the original d dimension space down to k
dimension space, with an error of ε. The FJLT, denoted Φ = FJLT (n, d, ε), is given by:
Φ = P ·H ·D (2.15)
where P is a matrix of size k x d with components distributed according to a normal
distribution with zero–mean and variance q−1, H is a normalized Hadamard matrix of
size d x d, and D is a d x d diagonal matrix whose elements are distributed uniformly in
the interval [-1,1].
The authors chose FJLT to reduce dimension because, being a random projection, it
enhances the security of the hashing method and also because FJLT is robust to most
routine degradations and malicious attacks.
The proposed hashing scheme based on FJLT is divided into three steps: random
sampling, dimension reduction by FJLT, and ordered random weighting as described
below:
Step 1 Random Sampling consists in selecting a limited number of subimages as original
features. The novelty of the Lv et al. approach is that subimages are considered
as points in high–dimensional space. For example, the sub–images in Fig.2.10 are
squares of size p x p which can be represented as points in a p2–dimensional space.
The original feature is constructed by concatenating the columns of the N subimages
Ri, i = 1, ..., N , which were pseudo–randomly selected from the gray–level input
image by using a secret key:
Feature = {R1, R2, ..., RN} (2.16)
The advantage of this approach is that the Feature matrix contains global infor-
mation of the image, while the the components Ri contain local information, being
thus resistant to geometric attacks like cropping.
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Figure 2.10: Random sampling.
Step 2 Dimension Reduction: by using FJLT, the essential features of the original data
are captured in a lower–dimensional space. In this step, the authors map the above
Feature matrix from a p2 x N space to a k x N space. The intermediate hash IH
is defined as
IH = Φ(Feature) = P ·H ·D · Feature (2.17)
where P , H and D are the matrices used in 2.15. The dimension k can be obtained
by tuning the number of subimages.
Step 3 Ordered Random Weighting is necessary because, even after dimension reduction,
the intermediate hash can be too large. The hash is computed as:
Hash = {< IH1, w1 >, ..., < IHN , wN >} (2.18)
where IHi is the ith column of IH, {w}Ni=1 are the pseudorandom weight vectors,
and < a, b > is the inner product of vectors a and b.
The hash obtained by using this scheme is an intermediate hash, but a final hash value
can be obtained by using a compression step as in [Swaminathan 2002, Monga 2006].
Because the FJLT hashing scheme is sensitive to rotations, the authors propose a
rotation invariant Fast Johnson–Lindenstrauss Transform (RI–FJLT) hashing scheme .
The steps of the proposed approach can be summarized as follows:
1) Convert an input image into log–polar coordinates:
I(x, y)→ J(logρ, θ) (2.19)
where x and y are Cartesian coordinates and ρ and θ are Log–Polar coordinates.
By changing the representation system, rotation and scaling will be horizontal and
vertical offsets as it can be seen in Fig.2.11.
2) Apply Mellin Transform (MT) to image J in order to obtain the magnitude feature
image;
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Figure 2.11: Example of how rotation attack affects an image in Cartesian and Log–
polar system: a) Original image in Cartesian system; b) Rotated image with 45 degrees
in Cartesian system; c) Original image in Log–polar coordinates; d) Rotated image in
log–polar coordinates.
3) Obtain the hash value by applying the FJLT hashing scheme described above on the
magnitude feature vector;
In the identification stage, for a candidate image Ic, the hash value is computed. Then
the Euclidean distances to each original image existing in the database are calculated. The
candidate image Ic is identified as being the one that yields the minimum corresponding
distance.
The FJLT hashing scheme achieves similar or better performance than the NMF hash-
ing scheme under manipulations and attacks such as additive noise, blurring, geometric
attacks, JPEG compression and Gamma correction. Poor performance is achieved only
in the case of the rotation attacks. This deficiency is remedied by incorporating MT into
the algorithm.
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2.3.5.2 Image hashing in print–and–scan scenario
The print–and–scan attack is a difficult problem not yet solved in image hashing. In
the literature, few image hashing algorithms have been tested against print–and–scan
attacks.
In 2007, Yu et al. have proposed in [Yu 2007] an image hashing algorithm robust to
print–and–scan attack. The method is based on the algorithm proposed in [Monga 2005].
In the hash extraction step, the authors replace the end–stop wavelet, employed in [Monga 2005],
with the extractor proposed in [Zitova 1999].
In the process of structure matching a modified version of the Hausdorff distance,
proposed by Monga et al. in [Monga 2005] is used for comparing the hashes of two images.
If the distance is smaller than a predefined threshold ε, then the image is considered
authentic.
The algorithm proved to be robust to print–and–scan attack, compression, common
signal processing operations, global and local geometric transformations.
In [Wu 2009], Wu et al. propose an image hashing algorithm robust to print–and–scan
and sensitive to content changing.
Wu et al. analyzed the print–and–scan attack and divided them into three types:
• degrading attacks such as filtering and noise adding, which modify pixels indepen-
dently;
• global attacks such as luminance adjustment, which modify pixels uniformly;
• geometric attacks such as rotation and scaling, which modify pixels position;
In order to face these three types, they suggest to extract the feature as the relationship
of the Radon coefficients after applying WT. The feature extraction is presented in Fig.
2.12.
Figure 2.12: Wu et al. proposed scheme for image hashing.
Firstly, the Radon transform is applied on image I. Before feature extraction, some
pre–processing steps are needed:
• deleting the rows containing “0” ’s in order to remove the redundancy introduced by
rotation and shifting;
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• locating two points A and B in the Radon matrix and cyclically shift the matrix
vertically until the two points are situated in the middle row;
Next, the Radon transform is divided in 40 x 20 blocks and the mean of each block is
computed. A 2–level wavelet decomposition is employed to obtain the features from the
Radon coefficients. On the high frequency wavelet coefficients the Fast Fourier Transform
(FFT) is performed and only the real components are retained to construct the hash
vector. The final hash is obtained by binarizing the FFT coefficients by using as threshold
the coefficients mean.
This algorithm presents advantages such as security, good discrimination and espe-
cially robustness to the print–and–scan attack.
2.4 Conclusion
In this chapter several types of image hashing algorithms have been presented. The two
main domain applications, indexing and authentication, have also been defined. It has
been shown how hash functions provide an efficient way of protecting image content–
integrity and which are the desirable properties of a hash in order to attain robustness
and security.
Various algorithms for constructing image hashes schemes able to survive to non–
malicious degradations and malicious attacks have been proposed in the literature, but
there is no universal hash robust to all types of attacks. Some of the most important
problems when designing a hash scheme include the extraction of perceptually more
robust features, suitable distance metric, used to measure the similarity between the
hashes of two images, more sophisticated strategies for introducing secret keys, etc.
In this chapter an attempt to classify the large number of existing algorithms has
been made. The first perceptual image hashing schemes, based on histogram intensity,
proved to be insecure. Several hash algorithms based on DCT/DWT, low–level feature
extraction, relation–based, proved to be resistant to attacks such as JPEG compression,
blurring, scaling, etc. But the recently developed algorithms, based on dimension reduc-
tion techniques, outperform the former algorithms regarding robustness. Even if these
algorithms report good results for JPEG compression or rotation, few of them have been
tested in print–and–scan scenario.
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Chapter 3
Independent Component Analysis
3.1 Introduction
This chapter is an introduction to the concept of ICA. ICA is a variant of PCA in which
the components are supposed to be statistically independent. Section 3.2 presents PCA
as a powerful tool for analyzing images. It consists in feature extraction and image com-
pression by reducing the number of dimensions. The main steps needed when performing
PCA are also described in this section.
Foundations and basic knowledge necessary to understand ICA are presented in sec-
tion 3.3. Several algorithms for achieving statistically independent components are de-
scribed in section 3.4. Section 3.5 summarizes the main ideas of this chapter.
3.2 Principal Component Analysis
PCA represents a classic statistical technique for feature extraction and compression
which was introduced by Pearson in 1901 [Pearson 1901]. The goal is to reduce the
redundancy from large data sets by using the correlation between data elements as a
measure. Thus, the PCA algorithm is based only on the first and the second order
statistics.
Let us consider a data set formed by a random vector X.While the first and second
order statistics are known or can be estimated, no explicit assumption on the probability
density is made in PCA. First, the variables in X are centered by subtracting the mean
and the variance is set to 1 by normalization:
centering X ← X − E{X}
normalization X ← X/std(X) (3.1)
Next the vector X is linearly transformed into a vector P so that the redundancy due
to correlation is removed. The transformation consists of finding a rotated orthogonal
coordinate system so that the elements of X in the new coordinate system should become
uncorrelated [Hyva¨rinen 2001]. The first axis corresponds to the maximal variance of the
projection of X on the new coordinate axes, the second axis to the maximal variance
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in the direction orthogonal to the first axis. The components which have very small
variance values can be discarded, while the rest form the elements of vector P . Thus, the
first component extracted has the maximal amount of the total variance in the observed
variables, where the total variance accounts for the sum of the variance of each element
in X.
The PCA algorithm can be summarized by the following steps:
a) Centering and normalization of the data set as described in 3.1;
b) Computation of the covariance matrix:
CovX = E{XXT} (3.2)
c) Calculation of the eigenvalues d1, d2, ...dn and eigenvectors, C1, C2, C3, ..., Cn of the
covariance matrix;
d) Choosing the components and forming the P vector. The eigenvectors, (C1, C2, C3, ...,
Cn), obtained at the previous step are ordered as columns of a matrix from the
highest to the lowest eigenvalue, d1, d2, ...dn. Thus, the first principal component of
X is given by :
P1 = C
T
1 X (3.3)
The eigenvalues of CovX denotes the variance of the corresponding principal com-
ponent and can be easily proven by:
E{P 2m} = E{(CTmX)2} = E{CTmXXTCm} = CTmE{XXT}Cm = CTmCovXCm
(3.4)
By taking into account that the mean of the original data set, X is zero, E{X}=0,
then the principal components have also zero mean, i.e. E{Pm} = CTmE{X} = 0.
Thus, a small value of the variance (a small eigenvalue, dm) indicates that the
principal component Pm is close to zero.
An important practical problem is how to determine the number of principal com-
ponents which should be retained. The error between the new compressed data set
obtained after PCA algorithm was applied, Xˆ, and the original data set, X can be
expressed as following:
E{||X − Xˆ||2} =
n∑
i=m+1
di (3.5)
wherem is the number of principal components selected. Hence, the error is the sum
of the eigenvalues corresponding to the discarded eigenvectors, C(m+1), C(m+2), ..., Cn.
If m = n the error is zero; it increases as more and more principal components are
discarded. In other words a trade–off has to be made between the error and the
amount of data needed for expansion. One of the most straightforward method
for deciding the number of the principal components to be retained is the variance
criterion. The eigenvalues of the covariance matrix are usually sharply decreasing,
thus, a lower limit for the eigenvalue can be set so that the verry small principal
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components are discarded. The computation of the threshold can be determined by
using a priori information about X, if it is available. However, a good value for m is
obtained by using the Akaike’s information criterion and the minimum description
length criterion.
e) Deriving the new data set : The original data set X can be expressed by using the
PCA truncated form:
Xˆ =
m∑
i=1
PiCi (3.6)
There are different algorithms described in the literature for finding the computation
of the PCA, like: neural networks [Haykin 1998], recursive least–squares approach (the
PAST algorithm) [Haykin 1998], etc.
3.3 Independent Component Analysis
The linear statistical model for ICA is a factorisation:
X = AS (3.7)
The objective of ICA is the estimation of the mixing matrix A and of the indepen-
dent components S based on the observation vector X and under the assumptions
that [Hyva¨rinen 2001]:
• The columns of the mixing matrix A are linearly independent;
• The elements of the vector S, i.e. the independent components, are mutually inde-
pendent and also independent from the components;
• The independent components must have a nongaussian distribution; it can be easily
proven that, in the case of independent components with Gaussian distribution,
the orthogonal mixing matrix cannot be estimated because the distribution of the
observations is the same as the one for the independent components, regardless the
orthogonal mixing matrix A. Moreover, ICA is based on higher order cumulants
which for a Gaussian distribution are zero, thus ICA is essentially impossible if the
sources have Gaussian distributions;
Conceptually, ICA is “stronger” than PCA because, while the latter is based only on
second order cumulants, ICA retains higher order cumulants, especially the kurtosis (4th
cumulant). Basically, ICA succeeds where PCA fails because statistical independence is
“stronger” than uncorrelatedness and whitening. Hence, while two random independent
variables are also uncorrelated, contrariwise uncorrelatedness does not imply indepen-
dence. Moreover, whiteness of a random vector h with zero mean represents the fact that
the elements of the vector are uncorrelated and have unit variance, i.e. the covariance
matrix is equal with unit matrix: E{hhT} = I.
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Whitening can be obtained by using the SVD or Eigenvalue Decomposition (EVD).
Thus, whitening can be expressed as follows:
X˜ = TAS = A˜S (3.8)
where A˜ is the new mixing matrix which whitens the observation vector X and T is a
linear transformation applied in order to obtain the whitened version of X, X˜.
However, as stated before, the whitening is not sufficient for estimating the ICA model,
because e.g. if we consider an orthogonal transformation Y for E{X˜} then:
y = Y E{X˜} (3.9)
E{yyT} = {Y X˜Y T X˜T} = Y E{X˜X˜T}Y T = Y IY T = I (3.10)
A consequence of equation 3.10 is that the vector y is also white, thus it cannot be
distinguished whether the independent components are given by E{x˜} or y; because y
can be any orthogonal transformation of X˜, whitening is able to offer the independent
components up to an orthogonal transformation [Hyva¨rinen 2001].
However, whitening can be used to reduce the complexity of the ICA problem; thus, it
is very useful as a preprocessing step for ICA, because it gives an orthogonal matrix, A˜ for
A. Hence, the complexity of the problem reduces from having to estimate m2 parameters
(in the case m = p) to the case where only an orthogonal mixing matrix A˜ which contains
m(m− 1)/2 degrees of freedom has to be estimated.
The estimation of the independent components is reduced to:
S = WX, W = A−1 (3.11)
There are different approaches for the estimation of all the parameters of the ICA
model:
• Maximization of nongaussianity : according to the central limit theorem, the sum
of two independent variables is more Gaussian than the original variables. Thus,
the sum of the independent components, S, is more gaussian than every si and
it becomes the least gaussian when it equals one of the independent components
si (this is true if the si have the same distribution [Hyva¨rinen 2001]); In order to
measure the nongaussianity, the fourth order cumulant (kurtosis) is introduced:
kurt(X) = E{X4} − 3E{X2}2, E{X2} = 1⇒ kurt(X) = E{X4} − 3 (3.12)
where X is centered and normalized. The absolute value or the square value of the
kurtosis is used for measuring the nongaussianity. Thus, Gaussian random variables
have a kurtosis equal to zero while for most of the nongaussian random variables the
kurtosis is greater than zero. An algorithm which uses the kurtosis to estimate the
independent components is the Fast Independent Component Analysis (FastICA)
algorithm introduced by [Hyva¨rinen 1997]. The advantage of this algorithm is the
very fast and reliable convergence in comparison with gradient–based algorithms.
However, the kurtosis is very sensitive to outliers making it not a robust measure
of nongaussianity. Another measure of nongaussianity which is opposite to kurtosis
32
3.3. INDEPENDENT COMPONENT ANALYSIS
in many ways, i.e. it is robust but complicated, is the negentropy. It is based on
the differential entropy from information theory and on the fact that a gaussian
random variable has the largest entropy among all variables with equal variance.
The negentropy can be defined as follows:
J(X) = H(Xgauss)−H(X) (3.13)
where Xgauss is a gaussian random variable with the same covariance matrix of
the random variable X and H(X) is the entropy. J(X) is nonnegative and it is
equal with zero if and only if X has a gaussian distribution. However, because the
negentropy is complicated to determine an estimate of higher order cumulants is
usually used:
J(X) ≈ 1
12
E{X3}2 + 1
48
kurt(X)2 (3.14)
• Maximum likelihood estimation: Pham et al. [Pham 1992] formulated the likelihood
in the noise free ICA model according to:
L =
K∑
k=1
m∑
i=1
log fi(w
T
i X(k)) +K log |detW | (3.15)
where W = (w1, w2, ..., wm)T is the inverse matrix of A, fi are the density functions
of the independent components si, K are the samples for observations X(k);
There are different algorithms which use the likelihood maximization for solving
the ICA model:
– The Infomax algorithm [Bell 1995] - based on maximizing the output entropy
of a neural network with non–linear outputs. It was demonstrated that the
maximum likelihood estimation is equivalent with the infomax principle, i.e.
maximization of the network entropy [Cardoso 1997].
– A fast fixed–point algorithm: the FastICA algorithm introduced above for
nongaussianity maximization can be directly applied to the maximization of
the likelihood.
• Minimization of mutual information: Mutual information of a random vector, x,
with random components variables xi, i = (1..m) is:
I(X1, X2...Xm) =
m∑
i=1
H(Xi)−H(X) (3.16)
It measures the mutual dependence between two variables and it can also be inter-
preted as the code length. Hence, H(Xi) represents the code length for each element
in vector X, while H(X) is the code length of the random vector X. Mutual in-
formation is a measure that shows an increase in code length if the coding is done
on each component of X compared with the case of coding the global vector X.
However, in the case where the Xi are independent, coding each element separately
33
CHAPTER 3. INDEPENDENT COMPONENT ANALYSIS
would not increase the code length. Thus, in order to solve the ICA model, the
matrix W from equation 3.11 is estimated in such a way that the mutual informa-
tion of si is minimized. It can be demonstrated that the estimation of matrix W is
roughly equivalent to the maximization of the negentropy. The mutual information
is:
I(S1, S2...Sm) =
m∑
i=1
H(Si)−H(X)− log|detW | (3.17)
If the components of vector X are uncorrelated and have unit variance, then:
E{SST} = WE{XXT} W T = 1, thus:
I(S1, S2...Sm) = const.−
m∑
i=1
(Si) (3.18)
Equation 3.18 shows the fundamental relation between mutual information and
negentropy.
Moreover, the maximum likelihood and the mutual information are two intercon-
nected concepts , hence, it can be proved that the mutual information can be
expressed [Hyva¨rinen 2001] through the following formula:
1
K
E{L} =
K∑
k=1
E{log fi(wTi X)H(Xi)−H(X) (3.19)
• Tensorial methods : These types of methods are based on the fact that the eigen-
values of the cumulant tensors give the independent components. The fourth–order
cumulant is a four–dimensional array whose entries are given by the fourth–order–
cross–cumulants of the data [Hyva¨rinen 2001]. It can be considered as a forth–order
matrix. It also can be proven that the eigenvalues of the cumulant tensor given by
the kurtosis of the independent components are non–zero while the rest are zero.
The Joint Approximate Diagonalization Eigenmatrices (JADE) is a method which
shows how the cumulant tensors can be computed and which also deals with the
special case where the eigenvalues of the cumulant tensor are not distinct. A more
detailed description of the algorithm can be found in [Cardoso 1997]. Other meth-
ods based on the cumulant tensors are High Order Singular Value Decomposition
(HOSVD) [de Lathauwer 1995] and Higher Order Eigenvalue Decomposition (HO-
EVD) [Comon 1994].
• Other Methods : for solving the ICA model are:
– ICA based on nonlinear decorrelation and nonlinear PCA [Herault 1984]. It is
not used anymore in practice because it is not as efficient in comparison with
the new algorithm presented above;
– Methods that use time structure: in this case the ICA model is a little bit
different from the basic model because the samples of vectors X and S are
not random but have a specific order. Thus, these methods are based on time
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dependencies of the independent components using the autocovariance and
variance non stationarities as measures [Hyva¨rinen 2001]. A simple algorithm
using the time dependencies through autocovariance is AMUSE [Tong 1991].
However, this simple and fast algorithm is not able to discriminate between in-
dependent components associated with identical eigenvalues of the covariance
matrix of the whitened data set. Another algorithm which takes into consider-
ation the variance of non stationarities in order to solve the ICA model can be
derived from the FastICA [b) [Hyva¨rinen 2001]. Other algorithms using the
periodicity of the signals are proposed in [Tsalaile 2009]. Nevertheless, the al-
gorithms described in the basic ICA model can be used also, but because they
do not use the whole data structure they may converge far from the optimal
solution.
3.4 Various ICA algorithms
3.4.1 FastICA
In practice, algorithms for maximizing/minimizing the contrast function are needed. A
very efficient method of non–gaussianity maximization based on a fixed–point iteration
is FastICA [Hyva¨rinen 1997].
3.4.1.1 FastICA for one unit
FastICA for one unit refers to maximizing the non–gaussianity of wTX in order to obtain
one independent component. The weighted vector w represents one of the rows of matrix
A. The non–gaussianity is measured by the approximation of negentropy J(wTX) given
by :
J(wTX) ≈ [E{G(wTX)} − E{G(v)}]2 (3.20)
where v is a Gaussian variable of zero mean and unit variance.
The FastICA can be derived as an approximative Newton iteration. Let g be the
derivative of the non–quadratic function G. The main steps of the FastICA algorithm
can be summarized as follows:
Step 1 Choose an initial random weight vector w.
Step 2 Let w+ = E{Xg(wTX)}-E{g′(wTX)}w.
Step 3 Let w = w+/||w+||.
Step 4 If the convergence is not reached, go to Step 2.
3.4.1.2 FastICA for several units
The one–unit algorithm presented above estimates only one of the independent compo-
nents. In order to estimate more independent components, the FastICA algorithm for
one–unit must be applied several times for different weight vectors w1, ..., wn.
35
CHAPTER 3. INDEPENDENT COMPONENT ANALYSIS
In order to prevent that different weighted vectors w1, ..., wn converge to the same
maxima, a decorrelation step of the outputs wT1X, ..., wTnX after every iteration must be
introduced. Two methods for achieving de–correlation are presented below.
The first method is a deflation scheme based on a Gram–Schmidt–like decorrela-
tion. In this approach the independent components are estimated one by one. When
p independent components, or p vectors w1, ..., wp, have been estimated, the one–unit
fixed–point algorithm is performed for wp+1. After every iteration step, the projections
wTp+1wjwj, j = 1, ..., p are extracted from wp+1 and then wp+1 is renormalized:
Step 1 Let wp+1 = wp+1 −
∑p
j=1w
T
p+1wjwj
Step 2 Let wp+1 = wp+1/
√
wTp+1wp+1
A second method is a symmetric decorrelation–based method, in which no vectors are
“privileged” over others [Karhunen 1997]. This can be accomplished by using the classical
method involving matrix square roots:
W = (WW T )−1/2W
where W is the matrix of vectors (w1, ..., wn)T and the inverse square root (WW T )−1/2 is
obtained from the eigenvalue decomposition of WW T .
A simpler alternative is the iterative algorithm proposed in [Hyva¨rinen 1999]:
Step 1 Let W = W/
√||WW T ||
Step 2 Let W = 3
2
W − 1
2
WW TW
Step 2 is repeated until convergence is achieved. The norm in Step 1 is an ordinary
matrix norm, i.e. the 2–norm or the largest absolute row (or column) sum.
When compared with the existing methods for ICA, the FastICA algorithm presents
certain desirable properties as summarized below:
1. Cubic or at least quadratic convergence versus linear convergence for ordinary ICA;
2. The algorithm is easy to use; unlike gradient–based algorithms, no step size param-
eters have to be chosen;
3. The algorithm extracts directly independent components of any non-Gaussian dis-
tribution using any nonlinearity g;
4. The performance of the method can be increased by choosing a suitable nonlinearity
g;
5. Its computational load is decreased because the independent components can be
estimated one by one;
6. The FastICA algorithm is parallel, distributed, computationally simple and needs
little memory space.
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3.4.2 EFICA
Efficient Fast Independent Component Analysis (EFICA) is an improved version of the
FastICA algorithm, which is asymptotically efficient, i.e. its accuracy attains the Cramér-
Rao lower bound. The proposed EFICA algorithm in [Koldovsky 2006] has a computa-
tional complexity three times higher than that of ordinary symmetric FastICA. The
extracted independent components are modeled as Generalized Gaussian Distribution
(GGD) with adequate parameters.
Figure 3.1: EFICA algorithm proposed in [Koldovsky 2006].
3.4.2.1 Algorithm
The proposed algorithm associates the idea of the generalized symmetric FastICA with an
adaptive choice of the nonlinearity function g [Koldovsky 2006]. The algorithm contains
three steps:
Step 1 consists in performing the original symmetric FastICA with a standard function
g until convergence is reached;
Step 2 consists in an adaptive choice of the nonlinearity gk in order to estimate the cost
function of the extracted components;
Step 3 consists in a refinement of each of the independent components extracted by
using a general version one–unit FastICA algorithm proposed in [Koldovsky 2006].
Instead of one nonlinearity g, the general version uses the different nonlinearities
gk obtained in Step 2 ;
3.4.3 InfoMax
InfoMax is a method which maximizes the entropy of the auxiliary outputs y. y is defined
as:
y = g(S) (3.21)
The maximization of the joint entropy of two outputs consists of maximizing the
individual entropies while minimizing the mutual information [Bell 1995]. When the
mutual information is zero, the two outputs are statistically independent.
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3.4.3.1 Algorithm
The InfoMax is a gradient–based algorithm, which maximizes entropy. The gradient of
the unmixing matrix W is given by:
∇W = [W T (k)]−1 + [I − 2y(k)]XT (k) (3.22)
3.4.4 Pearson ICA
Pearson ICA [Karvanen 2000] is a BSS method combining the Pearson system, based on
the maximum likelihood approach, with first contrast functions.
The Pearson system is employed in order to model the distributions of the independent
components. The Pearson system is defined by:
f ′(x) =
(x− a)f(x)
b0 + b1x+ b2x2
, (3.23)
where a0, b0, b1 and b2 are the parameters of the distribution. The cost function of the
Pearson system is obtained from 3.23:
ϕ(x) = −f
′(x)
f(x)
= − x− a
b0 + b1x+ b2x2
. (3.24)
The parameters a0, b0, b1 and b2 can obtained from the method of moments. Parameters
a0, b0, b1 and b2 can be expressed as functions of second µ2, third µ3 and fourth µ4 central
moments of the distribution:
b1 = a = −µ3(µ4 + 3µ
2
2)
C
(3.25)
b0 = −µ2(4µ2µ4 − 3µ
2
3)
C
(3.26)
b2 = −(2µ2µ4 − 3µ
2
3 − 6µ32)
C
, (3.27)
where C = 10µ4µ2 − 12µ23 − 18µ32.
3.4.4.1 Algorithm
Karvanen and colleagues consider as contrast function the cost functions. Since the
independent components distributions are known, the cost functions are the optimal
choice for the contrast function.
In the Pearson ICA algorithm, the independent components distributions are esti-
mated by fitting the marginal distributions into the Pearson family by using the method
of moments.
The steps of the Pearson ICA algorithm can be summarized as follows:
Step 1 : Select as contrast function either the contrast function of the Pearson system
or the hyperbolic tangent. The contrast function selection is dependent of the third
and fourth moment;
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Step 2 : If the Pearson system was selected, the parameters of the distribution are
estimated by using the method of moments;
Step 3 : Compute the cost function φ for the Pearson system or for the hyperbolic
tangent;
Step 4 : Compute the demixing matrix W ;
The four steps are repeated until convergence is achieved.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter presents the concept of ICA as a fine–tuning of PCA. Both PCA and ICA are
powerful tools for feature extraction and for dimension reduction of an observed number
of variables.
PCA is an unsupervised statistical method that includes a preliminary learning stage.
In this stage PCA derives a basis of uncorrelated eigenvectors. The number of eigenvectors
may be reduced by discarding the ones corresponding to the least eigenvalues.
A drawback of PCA is that it only takes the second–order statistics into account.
ICA was developed to exploit higher–order statistics. ICA recovers statistically inde-
pendent components from a linear mixture. In order to attain independence, several
algorithms that optimize a specific cost function were implemented. Many of them use
PCA, called also weak independence. They iteratively optimize the cost function, whose
global optimum occurs when independence is achieved. For instance, InfoMax maxi-
mizes the entropy of the estimated independent components, FastICA maximizes their
non–Gaussianity and Pearson–ICA algorithm minimizes the mutual information of the
sources.
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Chapter 4
ICA Arhitecture I vs. ICA Arhitecture
II
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, two different ways of applying ICA on ID images are described. The
two representations proposed by Bartlett in [Bartlett 2002] are described in Section 4.2.
Depending on how ICA is applied on the data set, either statistically independent basis
vectors or statistically independent projection coefficients are obtained. In both cases, a
basis of images for projection is obtained. The proposed method for the verification of ID
images based on the two architectures is described in Section 4.3 and different algorithms
for selecting the most relevant components for the subspace projection are proposed in
Section 4.4. In Section 4.5, the performance of the two representations on simulated data
are compared. Section 4.6 concludes the chapter by summarizing the central ideas.
4.2 ICA Architectures
4.2.1 Generalities
The two different ways of applying ICA to ID images are known in the literature ( [Bartlett 2001], [Bartlett 2002])
as ICA architecture I and ICA architecture II.
4.2.1.1 Architecture I
In architecture I, ICA considers different images as random variables and pixels as variable
samples. The process is described in Fig. 4.1. The input face images, serialized and
placed on the different rows of matrix X, are considered to be a linear combination of
independent components S. The ICA algorithm approximates the weight matrix W in
order to recover the statistically independent components placed onto the rows of U,
the matrix of the estimated components. These components represent the basis images
employed in representing ID images. The first row of Fig. 4.2 shows a subset of eight
basis images obtained with architecture I. They are localized feature vectors (i.e. face
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Figure 4.1: ICA architecture I: finding statistically independent basis images.
characteristics) influenced only by small areas of the image. The ID image representations
are vectors of coordinates obtained by projecting these images with respect to the basis
defined by the rows of matrix U as in Fig. 4.3. These vectors are situated in the rows of
mixing matrix A = W−1.
Figure 4.2: Basis vectors. On the first row, respectively on the second, an example of
basis vector for Architecture I, respectively for Architecture II.
Figure 4.3: Face representation for ICA architecture I.
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Figure 4.4: ICA architecture I: finding statistically independent coefficients.
4.2.1.2 Architecture II
Even if the basis images are statistically independent, the coordinates that represent the
ID images in the subspace defined by ICA architecture I are not. The purpose of ICA
architecture II is to obtain statistically independent coordinates employed to represent
the input ID images. For this purpose, the ID images are serialized and organized onto the
columns of matrix X ; in this way pixels are considered as random variables and different
images as variable samples. Thus the columns of A, the pseudo–inverse of the weight
matrix W, are considered as basis images. The independent coefficients are recovered in
the columns of U (Fig.4.4). They represent the coordinates employed to reconstruct the
input ID images (Fig. 4.5).
Figure 4.5: Face representation for ICA architecture II.
Eight basis images obtained with architecture II are shown in the second row of
Fig. 4.2. They represent global features vectors unlike the ones obtained when using
architecture I.
4.2.2 Mathematical Background
Bartlett and colleagues propose in [Bartlett 1998], [Bartlett 2002] to perform ICA as a
two–step process in order to have control on the number of independent components
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allowing thus to create projection subspaces of size l, for any l ∈ N. This is done by using
PCA as a pre–processor and then by applying ICA on the resulted eigenvectors instead
of the input ID images. The replacement of the original ID images with the first l PC
eigenvectors will not affect the process. Even more, it increases ICA performances by
reducing dimensionality and computational complexity as argued in [Liu 1999].
4.2.2.1 Architecture I
In this section, the mathematical basis of the process depicted in Fig. 4.1 are described.
Let C be a m x l matrix containing the first l Principal Component (PC) vectors of n
input ID images and m the number of pixels in an image. Because in this representation
the rows of matrix X are variables and the columns are samples, ICA is applied on CT .
The l basis images from U used to represent the input ID images are determined as
follows:
P = X ∗ C → X = P ∗ CT (4.1)
where P is the matrix of PCA coefficients.
We know that ICA is applied on the transposed of C :
U = W ∗ CT (4.2)
From 4.1 and 4.2 we get
X = (P ∗W−1) ∗ U = B ∗ U (4.3)
Therefore the coordinates used to represent the input ID images are given by the rows
of the matrix
B = P ∗W−1 (4.4)
The coordinates for the test ID images were determined by using a PC representation
based on the training image set as defined in:
Btest = Ptest ∗W−1 (4.5)
Without PCA pre–processing, B = W−1 and Btest = Xtest ∗ UT .
4.2.2.2 Architecture II
In architecture II, ICA tries to find independent coefficients for the input images placed on
the columns of matrix U. Also in this approach, ICA is performed on the PCA coefficients
instead of the original ID images, in order to reduce dimensionality [Bartlett 1998], [Bartlett 2002].
Using the same notations as before:
U = W ∗ P T (4.6)
The ICA representation for the test ID images are placed in the columns of U as
follows:
Utest = W ∗ P Ttest (4.7)
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The basis vectors are obtained in the columns of A = W−1. Without PCA pre–
processing, Utest = W ∗XTtest
4.3 Our method for ID Image Verification
In this section I explain the proposed method for ID image verification applications. The
goal is to obtain an optimal ID image representation by using ICA in order to be robust
to print–and–scan attacks (a primary non–malicious attack that the ID image verification
system must take into account).
The application is a two step–process consisting in the following stages: learning,
enrollment and verification. In the first stage the image basis used for projecting the
images is computed. The enrollment stage, shown in Fig. 4.6, is a three–step process:
capture, process and enroll. The ID image is captured by using a sensing device (scanner,
camera, etc.). Further, the face is cropped from the image, processed into a hash and
stored on the microchip. In the last stage, verification, a new instance of the image is
captured, its hash is generated and compared with the existing hash on the card chip
(as in Fig. 4.7). If the two hashes are identical the person is considered to be a genuine,
otherwise an impostor.
The proposed method consists in two steps: learning and hash extraction as illustrated
in Fig. 4.8
Figure 4.6: Enrollment stage.
4.3.1 Learning
In order to estimate the basis vectors the following steps are executed [Smoaca 2011]:
a) Image preprocessing and registration. Each image from the learning set is converted
into gray tones and normalized in order to have zero mean and variance equal to
one. The registration is accomplished by using a set of reference points. Each image
is centered by using to coordinates of the eyes and the mouth as in Fig. 4.9.
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Figure 4.7: Verification stage.
Figure 4.8: Proposed algorithm scheme: learning and hash extraction stage.
b) Face cropping and resizing. Each face is cropped and resized at 60x50 pixels.
c) Image serialization. The images are serialized and placed on the rows, respectively
columns, of matrix X, depending whether ICA architecture I or ICA architecture
II is employed.
d) Basis learning. The basis vectors are obtained by applying ICA architecture I/ICA
architecture II. In architecture I the basis image vectors are independent localized
features, while in architecture II they are non–independent global features.
e) Subspace selection. This step is necessary in order to retain only the most relevant
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Figure 4.9: Image registration, cropping and resizing.
basis vectors from an information point of view. The subspace selection strategies
described in section 4.4 are used.
4.3.2 Hash Extraction
In both enrollment and verification stage, the hash extraction step is performed. After
the image capture process, any new image is first pre–processed through steps a)–c) from
the learning stage. Next, the following steps are applied:
f) Subspace projection coefficients. The coefficients used for representing any new ID
image are acquired by projecting the input image on the basis obtained in step e).
According to architecture I, each image I is represented as in 4.8:
I =
l∑
j=1
bjsj (4.8)
where sj are the independent basis vectors (ICs) and bj the coordinates used for
ICA representation.
Similarly, in architecture II, each image I is represented by:
I =
l∑
j=1
ujaj (4.9)
where aj are the basis vectors and uj the independent coordinates used for ICA
representation (ICs).
g) Coefficients quantization and binarization. Since the ICA representation of a new ID
image consists in continuous values, these values have to be quantized and binarized
in order to obtain a binary hash.
1) Quantization
In the approach based on ICA architecture I, the histograms of the ICA repre-
sentations for various face images cannot be modeled by a specific distribution
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(a) (b)
Figure 4.10: Coefficient quantization: a) uniform quantization; b) equiprobable quanti-
zation.
(Fig. 4.10 a)). Thus we employ the uniform quantization in order to partition
uniformly the interval of the subspace projection coefficients. In the ICA ar-
chitecture II approach, the histograms of the independent coefficients can be
modeled by a GGD as in Fig. 4.10 b) and thus an equiprobable quantization
can be used to divide the subspace projection coefficients in intervals with
equal probability.
The difference between the two types of quantizations is that in the uniform
quantization the partition is based on the interval length of the ICA represen-
tation, whereas in the equiprobable quantization it is based on the probability
density function of the ICA representation.
A. Uniform quantization
Let b ∈ [bmin, bmax] denote the input of the quantizer. bmax and bmin
represent the maximum and the minimum values of the variable b. A
Uniform Quantizer approximates variable b according to the following
rule:
QU(b) = i, if b ∈ (di, di+1) (4.10)
where i = 0, ..., L− 1 is the quantization level, L is the number of quanti-
zation levels and dk, k = 0, ..., L− 1 is the decision level which satisfies:
dk+1 − dk = ∆ (4.11)
The step size ∆ of the quantizer satisfies relation 4.12:
∆ =
bmax − bmin
L
(4.12)
B. Equiprobable quantization
In ICA architecture II the ICs histograms can by modeled by a GGD
expressed as:
p(x) =
β
2αΓ( 1
β
)
exp−( |x|
α
)β (4.13)
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This allows to design an Equiprobable Quantizer described by the follow-
ing rule:
QE(b) = i, if b ∈ (di, di+1) (4.14)
for i = 0, ..., L− 1.
The decision levels di+1 and di satisfy∫ di+1
di
p(x)dx =
1
L
(4.15)
meaning that the probability that b falls into any of the intervals {[di, di+1],
i = 0, L− 1} is 1/L.
After quantization, the hash associated to any new image has the following
form:
ICA representation = (q1, q2, ..., ql) (4.16)
where l is the number of projection coefficients and q ∈ [0, 1, ..., L− 1].
2) Binarization
Figure 4.11: Gray code for n = 1, 2, 3 bits.
In both approaches, the discrete – binary conversion is done by applying the
Gray code [Gray 1953]. An important property of the Gray code is that ad-
jacent words in the code sequence differ in one bit only [Doran 2007] (Fig.
4.11).
After binarization, the intermediate hash has the form:
ICA representation = (gn1 , g
n
2 , ..., g
n
l ) (4.17)
where gnk for k = 1, l refers to the Gray codeword of the discrete number k - 1
on n bits.
In the rest of the section I will refer to the intermediate hash of an image I as h(I). The
last stage of the enrollment and verification process consists in storing the intermediate
hash in the former process and, respectively, comparing it with the pre–existing one in
the latter.
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4.4 Subspace selection criteria
In the print–and–scan process an image is converted from digital to hard–copy and again
to digital. These conversions represent noise which modifies the content of the image and
thus the extracted hash. Since the extracted hash is obtained by projecting an image
on a certain subspace, it depends on the subspace chosen for image projection. This
implies the importance of ICs selection in the learning stage. By choosing the most
significant components for the projection subspace, the noise introduced in the print–
and–scan process of an image can be attenuated.
The ICs selection can be done by the strategies presented in [Smoaca 2011]:
a) selection by PCA.
b) selection by entropic criterion.
c) combination of a) and b).
The selection by PCA can be used in both ICA architecture I and II approaches,
while the selection by entropic criterion as presented in [Smoaca 2011] is used only for
the former one.
4.4.1 Selection by PCA
The selection by PCA is done by using a variance criterion since it takes into consideration
only second order statistics. The removal of components is accomplished in the pre–
processing step of the ICA process. It consists in retaining only the highest variance
coefficients. An example is illustrated in Fig. 4.12. Using the subspace obtained after
PCA selection in the ICA process the performance is improved and the complexity is
reduced.
Figure 4.12: Selection of the eigenvalues: only 85% of the original signal energy (left side
of the red bar) are retained.
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4.4.2 Entropic criterion
Figure 4.13: Proposed selection of the components by area–criterion. The top row shows
eight binarized ICs obtained with ICA architecture I. The second row displays the area
of the above ICs. Only ICs with low area must be retained.
The goal is to obtain an adequate projection subspace which, when projecting an
image that has been affected by the scan noise introduced when authenticating the ID
document, will lead with high probability to the same hash value as the one stored on the
microchip of the document. For the proposed image hashing scheme, a suitable projection
subspace can be obtained by selecting only the components that are relevant in the sense
of information content.
In Fig. 4.13 eight binarized ICs obtained by performing ICA architecture I are illus-
trated. It is interesting to notice that, even if by using architecture I the basis vectors
should be localized features, there are several components in which, behind the human
biometric features (eyes, mouth, nose, etc.), more or less salient face images appear. This
means that the relevant components in the sense of information content are the ones with
less salient face images appearing behind face features.
Since the basis vectors used for image projection are obtained by performing FastICA
algorithm, which maximizes the negentropy, the choice of an entropic criterion to select
the ICs is a natural one. Two types of entropic selection are proposed in this section:
• global entropic selection: keeps the most significant components with minimal en-
tropy;
• local entropic selection: keeps the most significant components with maximal en-
tropy;
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There are many methods for entropy estimation. For the entropic criterion there is
no need for an accurate source model for face features. The goal here is rather to have an
efficient and fast selection than an accurate model. This is the reason why face features
binarization and zero-order entropy estimate can be considered. It is known that for
a binary memory–less source of information, the entropy is maximum for p = 0.5 and
symmetrical about this point (p is the probability of one of the symbols).
Entropy estimate can be advantageously replaced by area measurements. On the
second row of Fig. 4.13, the area values corresponding to eight binarized ICs are shown.
It can be observed that the relevant components, with low entropy, have low area value.
The global entropic criterion is presented in Fig. 4.14. The global criterion considers
only the components that present low entropy as relevant. In this case low entropy ICs
are the ICs with less salient face images appearing behind face features. Using this space
selection criterion, only the components with low area value are retained and used further
in the projection step. The area is computed on the binarized components as the ratio
between the white pixels and black pixels. The threshold employed for binarization has
been obtained by applying Otsu’s method on the ICs.
Figure 4.14: Global entropic criterion.
Further, we refined the components selection, by discarding those with no salient face
features. In this strategy, after binarizing the components as before, the ICs images have
been split into 3 strips as shown in Fig. 4.15: the upper third containing the eyes and
eyebrows, the middle third containing the nose and the lower one containing the mouth.
The most significant ICs are the ones that have maximal local entropy, which implies that
the ICs have maximum entropy (bigger area) on a single strip and (quasi) null entropy
on the other two. By using this strategy, the projection subspace can be constructed so
that it will contain only one type of face feature, i.e. eyes, but it is preferable to have all
types of face features, i. e. eyes, mouth, nose, eyebrows.
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Figure 4.15: Local entropic criterion
4.5 Results on simulated data
Our method was tested on a subset of the FERET database of facial images ( [Phillips 1998],
[Phillips 2000]). In order to stay close to ID images, only the subjects with frontal view
and neutral expression subjects were kept. In the learning stage a training set of 300 gray
level images of 384x256 pixels (Fig. 4.16) has been used to determine the basis vectors
in both ICA architecture I and II approaches. For enrollment and verification, another
Figure 4.16: Samples from FERET database.
set of 210 different subjects’ images was considered. All the input ID images were passed
through steps a)–b) from the learning stage. They were registrated, cropped and resized
to 60x50 pixels as shown in Fig. 4.9. All the images, used for learning, enrollment and
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verification, were registered to a reference set of coordinates obtained by averaging the
eyes and mouth coordinates provided by the FERET database .
Figure 4.17: The experimental data. Examples of images affected by affine transforms
on the first row, JPEG compression on the second row, median filtering on the third and
addition of white gaussian noise on the last row.
By projecting the input ID images used for enrollment and verification on the learned
basis vectors and by quantizing the obtained coordinates on 8 levels and Gray encoding,
an intermediate binary hash h(I) is obtained for each image I.
Since the designed hashing algorithm must be robust to print–and–scan attack which
is considered as a combination of several attacks, such as filtering, noise adding, scaling,
small affine transform, small random twist, JPEG compression, luminance and contrast
adjustment and chrominance variations [Lin 1999b], the intermediate hashes h(I) were
tested against a series of stirmark attacks [Petitcolas 1998], [Petitcolas 2000] (affine trans-
forms, JPEG compression, additive Gaussian white noise and median filter). Samples of
the attacked test images are shown in Fig. 4.17. The Hamming distance was employed to
compare the binary intermediate hashes before (extracted in the enrollment stage) and
after the attack (extracted in the verification stage). The performance of the method can
be described by using the r–value and Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves.
The r–value measures the gap between the means of the Hamming distances distributions
of the similar faces (originals and attacked) and dissimilar ones: it is defined as:
r − value = |µs − µd|
σs + σd
(4.18)
where µs, σs and µd, σd are the mean and standard deviation of the similar faces, respec-
tively of the dissimilar faces. The higher the r − value is, the higher the performance of
the method is, i.e. the gap between the two Hamming distances distributions is larger.
54
4.5. RESULTS ON SIMULATED DATA
4.5.1 Approach ICA architecture I
For the results presented in tables 4.1 and 4.2, FastICA software was used to analyze
the learning set and extract the basis vectors. For 300 input ID images, FastICA can
extract a maximum of 300 ICs leading to an intermediate binary hash h of 900 bits. In
order to shorten the length of h, PCA was used as a pre–processor before ICA. Thus,
we retained only the first 60 coefficients carrying 94% of the signal’s energy. Further, the
ICs with salient features are selected by using the global entropy criterion. The 60 basis
vectors were split into two subsets: one of 33 ICs with low entropy (Case I) and another
one of 27 ICs with high entropy (Case II). The separation in the two subsets was done
by evaluating the white area on the binarized basis vectors. For all experiments, Otsu’s
method was used to determine the binarization threshold.
Attack Similar faces Dissimilar faces r-value
mean σ mean σ
AFFINE _1 5.6 2.3 37.7 6.5 3.7
Case I AFFINE _2 18 4.3 38.5 6.3 1.9
AFFINE _3 6.6 2.4 37.8 6.4 3.5
AFFINE _4 28.7 5.7 42 5.6 1.2
AFFINE _5 8.2 2.7 37.8 6.4 3.3
AFFINE _6 9.9 3.2 38 6.3 3
WN σ = 0.01 17.5 5.5 34.53 7.1 1.3
Median 5× 5 13.6 4.4 38.1 6.4 2.3
AFFINE _1 4 1.9 31.7 6.7 3.2
AFFINE _2 18.7 4 33.4 5.6 1.5
Case II AFFINE _3 5 2 31.9 6.5 3.1
AFFINE _4 21.5 4.5 34.9 5.2 1.3
AFFINE _5 7.3 2.6 31.8 6.5 2.7
AFFINE _6 9.1 2.9 32.1 6.4 2.5
WN σ = 0.01 10.2 3.7 24.3 7 1.3
Median 5× 5 9.2 3.1 32.7 6.8 2.3
Table 4.1: Comparison between strong features and weak features.
Table 4.1 shows the importance of selecting only relevant basis vectors in the sense
of information content. The images were not %100 recognized because of the smaller
number of ICs (≈ 30 in both situations), but the performance is higher in Case I. For
example, for the AFFINE_1 geometric attack, the r–value is higher in Case I (3.7 vs.
3.2).
The other reducing strategies (only PCA, PCA and local entropy (LE) selection, PCA
with local and global entropy selection combined – LE–GE) were tested in the same way.
The results in table 4.2 show that the r–value increases with the number of selected ICs.
For example, for the geometric attack (AFFINE_3) when using the first 180 PC,
the r–value is 4.7 compared with 4.3 obtained for the first 120 PC. When tuning the
number of quantization levels, for a higher level of quantization the r–value increases
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Attack r-value Attack r -value
180 PCA AFFINE _1 5 AFFINE _2 2.4
L = 8 AFFINE _3 4.7 AFFINE _4 2.1
AFFINE _5 4.2 AFFINE _6 3.8
JPEG Q = 15 4.1 JPEG = 20 4
WN σ = 0.01 2.5 WN σ = 0.02 1.9
Median 3× 3 4.4 Median 5× 5 3.1
120 PCA AFFINE _1 4.7 AFFINE _2 2.1
L = 8 AFFINE _3 4.3 AFFINE _4 1.8
AFFINE _5 3.8 AFFINE _6 3.5
JPEG Q = 15 4.1 JPEG = 20 4
WN σ = 0.01 2.3 WN σ = 0.02 2.3
Median 3× 3 4.2 Median 5× 5 3
120 PCA AFFINE _1 3.7 AFFINE _2 2.1
L = 4 AFFINE _3 3.5 AFFINE _4 1.7
AFFINE _5 3.2 AFFINE _6 3
JPEG Q = 15 4.1 JPEG = 20 4
WN σ = 0.01 2 WN σ = 0.02 1.7
Median 3× 3 2.5 Median 5× 5 2.7
120 LE AFFINE _1 5.7 AFFINE _2 2.2
L = 16 AFFINE _3 4.8 AFFINE _4 2
AFFINE _5 4.2 AFFINE _6 4
JPEG Q = 15 4.4 JPEG = 20 5
WN σ = 0.01 2.5 WN σ = 0.02 1.9
Median 3× 3 4.3 Median 5× 5 3
Table 4.2: Results for different attacks and selection criteria for FastICA algorithm: PC,
LE (Local Entropy).
(2.1 vs. 1.7 for AFFINE_4 with 8, respectively 4 levels). For a constant number of
components and quantization levels (120, respectively 8), the r–value is higher when
using an entropic criterion (for AFFINE_5, the r–value is 4 for 120 LE and 3.8 for 120
PCA). The same tendency was observed also for the attacks where not all the images
were correctly identified.
Next, a second step is performed on the 120 LE components, by selecting the basis
vectors with global low area. For the cases where full recognition is not reached, more
ID photos are correctly identified than when using only PC selection. For example, for
AFFINE_4 attack, the r − value is 1.5 for 66PCA and 1.9 for 66LE–GE.
The distribution of the normalized Hamming distances for the various attacks from
Fig. 4.17 are shown in Fig. 4.18. The genuine and impostors distributions are well
separated for geometric attacks like AFFINE_1 and AFFINE_3, for JPEG compression
with a quality factor of 15 or higher, for median filtering by a 3 x 3 window and for white
gaussian noise with σ = 0.01. The distributions overlap in the case of geometric attacks
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Attack r-value Attack r -value
66 PCA AFFINE _1 4.8 AFFINE _2 1.7
L = 8 AFFINE _3 4.3 AFFINE _4 1.5
AFFINE _5 3.7 AFFINE _6 3.4
JPEG Q = 15 4.1 JPEG = 20 4
WN σ = 0.01 2.3 WN σ = 0.02 1.7
Median 3× 3 4.1 Median 5× 5 2.8
66 LE – GE AFFINE _1 4.4 AFFINE _2 1.9
L = 8 AFFINE _3 4.1 AFFINE _4 1.9
AFFINE _5 3.5 AFFINE _6 3.3
JPEG Q = 15 4.1 JPEG = 20 4
WN σ = 0.01 5 WN σ = 0.02 4
Median 3× 3 3.9 Median 5× 5 2.6
Table 4.3: Results for different attacks and selection criteria for FastICA algorithm: PC,
LE – GE.
like AFFINE_2 and AFFINE_4, median filtering by a 5 x 5 window or higher and for
white gaussian noise with σ = 0.02 or higher.
(a) AFFINE_1, r − value = 5.7 (b) AFFINE_2,r − value = 2.2
Figure 4.18
In Fig. 4.19 the histograms for a constant number of ICs in the case of JPEG com-
pression are shown. The more quantization levels, the more separated the genuine and
impostors distributions are.
Fig. 4.20 presents the distribution of genuine and impostors for the geometric attack
AFFINE_2 when the number of quantization levels is kept constant. The two histograms
are well separated for a higher number of ICs.
The influence of various ICA algorithms on the genuine and impostors distributions
is illustrated in Fig. 4.21. It is with the FastICA algorithm that the two histograms are
57
CHAPTER 4. ICA ARHITECTURE I VS. ICA ARHITECTURE II
(c) AFFINE_3,r − value = 4.8 (d) AFFINE_4,r − value = 2.4
(e) JPEG compression with Q = 15,r − value = 4.4 (f) JPEG compression with Q = 20,r − value = 5
(g) JPEG compression with Q = 50,r − value = 6.4 (h) JPEG compression with Q = 70,r − value = 7.4
Figure 4.18
58
4.5. RESULTS ON SIMULATED DATA
(i) 3 x 3 median filter,r − value = 4.7 (j) 5 x 5 median filter,r − value = 3
(k) 7 x 7 median filter,r − value = 2.1 (l) gaussian noise with σ = 0.01,r − value = 5
(m) gaussian noise with σ = 0.02,r − value = 4 (n) gaussian noise with σ = 0.05,r − value = 3
Figure 4.18: Authentic and impostors distributions for several attacks for 120 LE and L
= 16.
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(a) 4 quantization levels, r − value = 3.5 (b) 8 quantization levels, r − value = 4.1
(c) 16 quantization levels, r − value = 4.4
Figure 4.19: Genuine and impostors histograms in the case of JPEG compression attack
with 15 quality factor and 120 LE with different quantization level.
the most separated.
The two distributions shown in Fig. 4.18 – 4.24 are not always well separated. The
overlap of the distributions gives two types of errors known in the statistical decision
theory as :
1) mistaking features vectors from two different persons to be from the same person
(called false match or false acceptance rate (FAR)).
2) mistaking two features vectors from the same person to be from two different persons
(called false non–match or false rejection rate (FRR)).
These errors may be estimated from the experimental data.
Mathematically, these two types of errors are usually expressed as the following con-
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(a) 180 ICs, r − value = 2.2 (b) 120 ICs, r − value = 2
(c) 60 ICs, r − value = 1.8
Figure 4.20: Genuine and impostors distribution in the case of AFFINE_2 attack for
different number of ICs and L = 16.
ditional probabilities:
FAR = P (D0|H1) (4.19)
FRR = P (D¯0|H0) (4.20)
where H0 is the null hypothesis, i.e. the extracted features vector corresponds to the
reference one (one–to–one comparison), H1 is the alternative hypothesis and D0 is the
decision region associated to H0, i.e. the Hamming distance lower than a predefined
threshold d0 (ID photograph is genuine). D¯0 is the complementary of the decision region
D0.
In order to determine a relevant configuration (ICs number, quantization levels, sub-
space selection criterion, ICA algorithm), we used also ROC curve analysis [Fawcett 2006].
The ROC curve is obtained as genuine acceptance rate (GAR) (1-FRR) vs. FAR when
varying d0.
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(a) FastICA, r − value = 5.7 (b) InfoMax, r − value = 4
(c) Pearson, r − value = 4.7 (d) ERICA, r − value = 3.8
Figure 4.21: Genuine and impostors histograms in the case of AFFINE_1 attack and
various ICA algorithms for 180 ICs and L = 16.
Examples of ROC curves are shown in Fig. 4.22–4.24. Fig. 4.22a) compares the
performances of the median filtering attack for a constant number of quantization levels
and different number of ICs. As for the r − value, the performance increases with the
number of ICs. It is visible that the curve for 180 components is superior to the other
ones. In Fig. 4.22b), the ROC curves for different quantization levels are illustrated. For
a GAR value of 99.5% the smaller FAR value is obtained for L = 16 quantization levels
(0.009% vs. 0.03%, 0.25%).
Fig. 4.24 compares different subspace reducing strategies in the case of median filter-
ing and white gaussian noise addition. The local entropic criterion achieves a low FAR
for a high GAR.
The same tendency observed for the r− value and the ROC curves is valid also when
employing another ICA algorithm.
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(a) (b)
Figure 4.22: ROC curves for median filtering attack with a 5 x 5 window for: a) L = 16
and different number of ICs; and b) 180 ICs and different quantization levels.
(a) (b)
Figure 4.23: ROC curves for different subspace strategies in the case of: a) median filter
with a 7 x 7 window; b) gaussian white noise with σ = 0.05.
4.5.2 Approach ICA architecture II
For the experiments in this section we have extracted the basis vectors from the same
learning set employed in the above section. In this approach, since the image pixels are
considered variables, FastICA can extract a maximum of 3000 ICs. PCA is used as a
pre–processor selecting the components that conserve 98.1% of the energy of the original
signal.
The results in table 4.4 reveal that when tuning the number of Ics, the performance
is better or equal for a higher number. For example, for AFFINE_5 r is 3.9 for 180
ICs and 3.7 for 120 ICs. Only AFFINE_3 and AFFINE_7 have a higher r–value (4.5
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(a) (b)
Figure 4.24: ROC curves for PCA and ICAI in the case of: a) median filter with a 7 x 7
window; b) gaussian white noise with σ = 0.05.
vs. 4.3 and 3.6 vs. 3.4). For a higher number of quantization level, the algorithm has
worse performance. For a smaller quantization level the r–value is higher or equal (for
AFFINE_4 1.1 vs. 1.2 for 8, respectively 4 quantization levels).
The same tendency is valid also when using InfoMax, Pearson and ERICA algorithms
to extract the ICs. The best performance is achieved when using FastICA algorithm.
The genuine and impostors distributions for a constant number of IC in the case of the
JPEG compression are shown in Fig. 4.26. The two histograms are not as well separated
as the ones in Fig. 4.19. An inverse tendency is noticed. The smaller the quantization
level is, the better separated the two histograms are.
Fig. 4.27 shows the two distributions in the case of the geometric attack AFFINE_2.
The number of ICs are tuned and the quantization level is kept constant. For a higher
number of ICs the overlapping interval is smaller.
Fig. 4.28 shows the ROC curves for the median filtering attack when tuning the
number of ICs and quantization levels. In Fig. 4.28a), the quantization level is kept
constant and the number of ICs is tuned. A better ROC curve is obtained for a higher
number of ICs. Fig. 4.28b) shows the ROC curves for a constant number of ICs. For
a GAR of 99.5% the smaller FAR is obtained for L = 4 quantization levels (0.12% vs.
0.27%, 0.3%).
The ROC curves, comparing the performances of different subspace selection strategies
for median filtering and white gaussian noise, are illustrated in Fig. 4.29. The ROC
curve for the 180 components obtained by applying ICA is superior to the one obtained
by applying PCA only.
When comparing the two architectures, ICA architecture I has better results in the
cases where full recognition is not achieved, i.e. when the two distributions overlap, but
also when all the images are correctly recognized. For example, for the geometric attack
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Attack r–value Attack r–value
180 PC AFFINE _1 5.8 AFFINE _2 1.2
L = 8 AFFINE _3 4.3 AFFINE _4 1.1
AFFINE _5 3.9 AFFINE _6 2.8
JPEG Q=15 4.1 JPEG Q=20 3.1
WN σ = 0.01 2.5 WN σ = 0.02 1.9
Median 3× 3 4.6 Median 5× 5 2.4
120 PC AFFINE _1 5.6 AFFINE _2 1.2
L = 8 AFFINE _3 4.5 AFFINE _4 1.1
AFFINE _5 3.7 AFFINE _6 2.8
JPEG Q=15 4.1 JPEG Q=20 3.1
WN σ = 0.01 2.3 WN σ = 0.02 2.3
Median 3× 3 4.6 Median 5× 5 2.4
120 PC AFFINE _1 5.4 AFFINE _2 1.2
L = 4 AFFINE _3 4.7 AFFINE _4 1.2
AFFINE _5 4 AFFINE _6 3.2
JPEG Q=15 4.1 JPEG Q=20 4.8
WN σ = 0.01 5.2 WN σ = 0.02 4.3
Median 3× 3 4.6 Median 5× 5 2.4
Table 4.4: Results for different attacks and selection criteria for FastICA.
(a) AFFINE_1,r − value = 5.4 (b) AFFINE_2,r − value = 1.2
Figure 4.25
AFFINE_2, a r− value of 2.2 is obtained when employing ICA architecture I compared
to 1.2 when employing ICA architecture II.
Examples of ROC curves obtained for ICA I and ICA II approaches and in the case
of AFFINE transforms, median filtering and noise addition are shown in Fig. 4.30. The
ROC curves obtained by using ICA I are superior to the ones obtained by using ICA II
for the selected attacks.
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(c) AFFINE_3,r − value = 4.6 (d) AFFINE_4,r − value = 1.2
(e) JPEG compression with Q = 15,r − value = 4.1 (f) JPEG compression with Q = 20,r − value = 4.8
(g) JPEG compression with Q = 50,r − value = 6.4 (h) JPEG compression with Q = 70,r − value = 7.4
Figure 4.25
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(i) 3 x 3 median filter,r − value = 4.6 (j) 5 x 5 median filter,r − value = 2.4
(k) 7 x 7 median filterr − value = 1.6 (l) gaussian noise with σ = 0.01,r − value = 5.2
(m) gaussian noise with σ = 0.02,r − value = 4.3 (n) gaussian noise with σ = 0.05,r − value = 3.8
Figure 4.25: Authentic and impostors distributions for several attacks for 120PC and L
= 4.
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(a) L = 4, r − value = 4.1 (b) L = 8, r − value = 4
(c) L = 16, r − value = 3.6
Figure 4.26: Genuine and impostors histograms in the case of JPEG compression with Q
= 15, 120 ICs and different quantization levels L.
4.6 Conclusion
This chapter develops a scheme for extracting the intermediate hashes from ID images
via ICA decomposition. Two ICA–based approaches for extracting the feature vectors
are presented. Several subspace selection algorithms which enforce the robustness of the
method are proposed.
The two approaches are tested on simulated data in order to demonstrate their ad-
vantages. Almost all images were successfully recognized in both approaches. The perfor-
mance i.e. r–value, varied when using different numbers of ICs and quantization levels.
The more ICs are used, the higher the performance is. The same tendency was ob-
served for ICA architecture I when increasing the number of quantization levels. In ICA
architecture II the opposite tendency was noticed.
In ICA architecture I the most suitable subspace selection proved to be the local
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(a) 180 ICs, r − value = 1.3 (b) 120 ICs, r − value = 1.2
(c) 60 ICs, r − value = 1.2
Figure 4.27: Genuine and impostors distribution in the case of AFFINE_2 attack for
different number of ICs and L = 4.
entropic criterion. When comparing the two architectures, ICA architecture I performed
better for the cases where full recognition is not achieved, i.e. when the genuine and
impostors histograms overlap.
The performances obtained by using the r − value are validated also by the ROC
curves and by looking at the genuine and impostors distributions.
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(a) L = 4 (b) 180 ICs
Figure 4.28: ROC curves for median filter with a 5 x 5 window. a) L = 4 and different
number of ICs; b) 180 ICs and different quantization levels.
(a) 180 ICs (b) 120 ICs
Figure 4.29: ROC curves for PCA and ICAII in the case of: a) median filter with a 7 x
7 window; b) gaussian white noise with σ = 0.05
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(a) Affine_2 (b) Affine_4
(c) Median 5 x 5 (d) Median 7 x 7
(e) Noise σ = 0.05
Figure 4.30: ROC curves for ICA I and ICA II under several attacks.
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Chapter 5
Print–and–Scan Channel
5.1 Introduction
This chapter presents an unifying framework for the print–and–scan channel. The goal
of the chapter is to highlight the fundamental noises and to show the proposed models
for these noises and also the solutions developed to cancel or to reduce them.
The devices employed in the process and the way they work are described in section
5.2. Section 5.3 defines the different kind of noise present in the print–and–scan process.
The exiting print–and–scan models are then described in section 5.4. Finally, section 5.5
summarizes the ideas discussed in this chapter.
5.2 Print–and–Scan Process
Nowadays the print–and–scan process is used for digital image reproduction and distribu-
tion. During the print–and–scan the image is modified. Even if the scanned image may
look like the original one, distortions – invisible or visible to the naked eye – intervene
in the process. These distortions appear both in the printing and the scanning process,
therefore the two processes will be described in the next two subsections. [Lin 1999a]
5.2.1 Printing
A printer is a peripheral that communicates with another device, i.e. computer, tele-
phone, automated teller machine (ATM), in order to produce text or graphic output on
physical print media, usually the paper.
Over the years, numerous printing technologies have been developed. In modern
printer devices the main technologies are the following:
• toner–based printers : laser printers are devices capable to create high quality text
and graphics on physical media. The hard copy is produced by the direct scanning
of a laser beam across the printer’s photoreceptor.
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• liquid inkjet printers : inkjet printers are the most frequent type of printing device
used by consumers. In this technology the digital image is reproduced by spurting
out droplets of ink onto the paper.
• solid ink printers utilize solid ink sticks in place of fluid ink or toner powder. The
waxy sticks are melted and scattered onto a spinning drum that fixes the ink on a
piece of paper.
• dye–sublimation printers : a dye–sublimation printer is a printing device which uti-
lizes the heating process in order to transfer dye to plastic cards, paper or canvas.
• inkless printers :
– thermal printers : the printer creates a hardcopy of an image by selectively
heating areas of thermal paper. The surface turns black in the regions where
it is heated, creating thus the image.
– UV printers : the printer employes a special UV light in order to write and
erase the sheet of paper.
Laser printing devices, in comparison with inkjet printers, have a better printing
resolution, are faster, with a lower cost per sheet of paper and they do not need special
paper as thermal printers.
In our experiments we have used a laser printer. Next, I will briefly describe the
principle of laser printers.
Figure 5.1: The circuit of a sheet of paper in laser printing [www.howstuffworks.com ].
The laser printing process consists in the following steps (Fig. 5.1):
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a) raster image processing : The generation of the image to be printed is done by a
Raster Image Processor (RIP), usually built into the printing device. In this stage
the image is converted into halftone image by using a page description language
such as Adobe PostScript, HP Printer Command Language or Microsoft XML Page
Specification.
b) charging : The main principle used in a laser printer is static electricity. The charged
corona wire (or charged roller) gives a total positive charge to the photoreceptor,
a revolving photosensitive drum or belt, able of keeping the electrostatic charge on
its coat.
c) exposing : While the drum rotates, the laser directs the laser beam through the surface
to discharge certain parts. The laser beam reverses the charge on the black areas
of the image, leaving a static electric negative image on the photoreceptor – an
electrostatic image.
d) developing : The printing device covers the drum with positively charged toner (black
powder). The fine particles stick to the electrostatic image, onto the areas touched
by the laser beam, negatively charged.
e) transferring : The image is transferred by pressing or revolving the drum belt onto
the sheet of paper. The paper is previously negatively charged by the corona wire.
In order to pull the toner powder, the paper charge must be stronger than the one
of the electrostatic image on the photoreceptor drum.
f) fusing : While the paper passes through the fuser (a couple of heated rollers), the toner
powder melts down and merges with the paper fibers. Then the fuser rolls out the
paper to the output tray (Fig. 5.2).
Figure 5.2: The printing process in laser printer [www.howstuffworks.com ].
g) cleaning : Once the paper is printed, an electrically neutral soft plastic blade removes
any surplus of toner from the photoreceptor, placing and depositing it into a dispose
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reservoir. A discharge lamp cleans the remaining charge from the drum. Sometimes,
when unanticipated events occurs such as paper jam, toner powder may remain on
the photoreceptor.
5.2.2 Scanning
A scanner is a stand–alone peripheral that captures a hard copy input (image, a document
etc.) and converts it to a digital image, allowing users to save the data on a computer
and reuse it. The scanner technology is widely used. The scanners may be classified as
follows:
a) flatbed scanners : also known as desktop scanners, are the most commonly employed
devices. Their basic principle applies to almost all the other scanners.
b) sheet–fed scanners are similar to flatbed scanners with the difference that the docu-
ment is moved and the scanning head is immobile. The shape of the devices is the
one of a small portable printer.
c) handheld scanners have the same technology as a flatbed scanner, except that the user
is the one moving the scanner. It is not suitable for obtaining high image quality.
d) drum scanners are employed in the publishing industry. In order to represent fine
detailed image they use the photomultiplier tube as scanning technology. The
original document is mounted on an acrylic cylinder and the sensor placed at the
center splits the light returned from the document into three colored beams: red,
green and blue light.
In our experiments a flatbed scanner (Fig. 5.3) was used. The anatomy of such a
device consists in the following parts: charged–couple device (CCD) array or contact
image sensor (CIS), mirrors, scan head, glass plate, lamp, lens, cover, filters, stepper
motor, stabilizer bar, belt, control circuitry, analog–to–digital converter (ADC).
The main component of a flat bed scanner is the image sensor – CCD array [Taylor 1998]
or CIS. The CCD or the CIS receives reflected light from the scanned image and the
integrated photodiodes convert it into an electrical signal (electrons). When the reflected
light falls on the CCD/CIS, it is converted into electrons. The brighter the light is, the
more electrons are produced. The image sensor amplifies these electrons in order to give
them a value which can be read by the ADC.
First, the paper is set on the glass plate and the cover is closed. The role of the cover
is to provide an uniform background used as a reference point for obtaining the dimension
of the document. Next, a lamp is employed to illuminate the document. A belt connected
to the stepper motor then gradually moves the scan head across the paper. An angled
mirror is used to reflect the image of the scan on a second (or third) mirror, depending
on the scanning device. The latter mirror reflects the image onto a lens which will focus
the image through a filter on the CCD array. Then the CCD employs an ADC to digitize
the image. The digital image will be sent to the scanner’s own hardware and from there
to the host computer.
76
5.3. NOISES IN PRINT AND SCAN ATTACKS
Figure 5.3: The scanning process.
5.3 Noises in Print and Scan Attacks
The print–and–scan process is an elaborate combination of strong and various attacks
which introduce modifications on the printed–and–scanned images. When successively
printing and scanning a digital image, the output is distinct, even if it appears similar to
the naked eye. Fig. 5.4 outlines the different kinds of distortions and noises an image is
subjected to when it is printed and scanned. In [Solanki 2006], Solanki et al. separated
these distortions into three main categories: geometric transformations, non–linear effects
and colored noise.
Figure 5.4: Noises in the print–and–scan process.
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A short description of distortions is given below:
1) gamma tweaking is a non–linear adjustment which takes place in printers. Many
printing device vendors modify the transfer characteristics of printers in order to
match an uncalibrated monitor. In this way, the printed image appears the same
as when displayed on the monitor.
2) digital halftoning : before printing, the digital image is transformed into a binary
image. This process of converting an image into a binary image is called halftoning.
The most common halftoning method represents each image pixel as halftone cell
(halftone pattern).
3) dot gain: it is a phenomenon causing the printed image to look darker than planned.
It is induced by the halftone dots growing in dimension between the original dot and
the final printed one. It is a non-linear process mainly caused by colorant spreading
around the dot.
4) print–to–print instability like banding, which consists in minor variations in the printer’s
output.
5) scanner gamma correction: is necessary in order to compensate the human visual
system (HVS). By gamma correction, the grey level of the output pixels is raised at
the power 1/γ, where γ is the gamma value of the monitor displaying the scanned
image.
6) digitization: converts a signal from the analog form to the digital one and introduces
quantization errors that can be amplified by the gamma correction. It consists in
two stages: discretization and binarization, both occurring simultaneously.
7) geometric transformations : while scanning, the image undergoes a series of geomet-
ric transformations such as cropping, rotation, scaling and translation. Most of
them are man–dependent and even in a careful scanning the effects of geometric
transformations cannot be avoided.
5.4 Review of the print–and–scan models
In order to model the print–and–scan process, the following effects should be taken into
consideration:
a) Pixel value distortions because of the print–and–scan process;
b) Geometrical distortions – rotation, scaling, translation (RST) –, which may be large–
grained (because of paper placement, for example) or fine–grained.
A lot of work on the print–and–scan channel has focused on empirically finding do-
mains that are invariant to some type of distortions. For instance, frequencies in which
non–linear effects predominate are ignored or transforms that have some inherent robust-
ness to geometrical distortion are chosen (e.g. log–polar or Radon).
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5.4.1 Countermeasures for print–and–scan noises
In [Yu 2005], Yu et al. analyze the structure of laser printer and scanner device and
propose a print–and–scan model for digital watermarking illustrated in Fig. 5.5.
Figure 5.5: Print–and–scan model proposed by Yu et al.
The authors do not give a statistical expression of the print–and–scan noise but try
to find a countermeasure to the noise. First, they briefly describe the distortion sources
in the print–and–scan process.
In the printer device, one source of distortion is considered to be introduced by the
optical system when converting the electronic pulse level into an optical one. Another
source of distortion is caused by the electrophotographic system which, because of the
non–smoothness of the drum and rollers surface, spreads the toner powder non–uniformly
on the paper. These two distortions can yield dot gain. The halftoning attack has the
most powerful effect on the image. The authors conclude that a countermeasure against
halftoning is mandatory.
In the scanner device, the optical system introduces a Gaussian blur, which is similar
to adding a Gaussian low–pass filter attack to the image. Another random Gaussian noise
is introduced by the stepped motion jitter of the carriage in the scanner. Thermal and
dark noise current are introduced by the CCD. The additive and multiplicative noises
that appear in the scanning process are difficult to correct but can be minimized by using
high resolution scanners.
The geometric distortions are random and specific to the user. Yu et al. consider that
the geometric distortions are fatal for watermarking methods and propose a countermea-
sure against this type of attack. It is a three step solution consisting in: pre–processing,
detection and correction process.
1) pre–processing step: it is known that ID cards have a rectangle frame in order to place
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the photograph of the card holder in the right position for good detection. Thus
the frame is important to locate the watermark and to identify the geometric dis-
tortions. The authors propose frame adding to the original image, frame which will
be detected on the printed and scanned image. Next, median filtering and Lapla-
cian sharpening are performed for geometric distortion detection and watermark
location.
2) detection step: the contour and frame of the pre–processed image are obtained by
using a morphological operator. Next, the difference image is computed and used
for the inner frame extraction. The output image, defined as the sum of the inner
and pre–processed image frame, is superposed with the preset rectangular frame
in order to calculate the rotation angle. The scaling factor is determined from the
length and distance of the output image contours.
3) correction step: it consists in two parts. The first is a coordinate transform in which
a conversion matrix is employed to undo rotation and the second is the elimination
of interpolation points.
Yu et colleagues divide the countermeasure against grayscale conversion attack in two
types:
1) without blur which models the grayscale conversion. The scanned halftone image is
divided into blocks of M x N according to the dimension of the halftone matrix.
Each block has one of the (M x N+1) halftone cells associated. The relationship
between x, the original image pixel, and the corresponding number of the halftone
cell, y, is
x = 256− (y − 1) ∗ [256/(M ·N)] (5.1)
2) with blur : The blurred halftone image is divided into blocks of M x N according
to the dimension of the halftone matrix. Each block is compared with the (M x
N+1) halftone cells and the least vector distance criterion is employed in order to
associate the block to the corresponding halftone cell. Each original pixel x is then
computed as in 5.1.
In [Solanki 2005], Solanki et al. model the print–and–scan process as a three com-
ponents process: mild cropping, coloured noise and non–linear effects. For the coloured
noise, two sources of distortions are considered: digital halftoning and the print–to–print
instability. Both distortions introduce high–frequency noise in the original image. The
non–linear transformations (such as gamma correction) affect the high–frequency, but
also the mid–frequency coefficients. The only one that affects all the frequency bands –
low, mid and high – is mild cropping. Unfortunately, the purpose of the authors in this
article is to achieve data hiding in the low–frequency coefficients, and thus, no counter-
measure for coloured and non–linear noise is proposed. The solution to mild cropping
is a simple hiding strategy. The only countermeasure proposed is a new method: to
approximate and undo the rotation. The method relies on the knowledge of the printer’s
80
5.4. REVIEW OF THE PRINT–AND–SCAN MODELS
halftoning algorithm. When scanning at high–resolution, the halftone cell can be cap-
tured and employed to estimate the rotation angle. The estimation is done by using the
fact that halftone cells are orientated with a certain angle with the horizontal.
In [Zhang 2009], both geometric distortions and pixel values distortion introduced by
the printing and scanning process are considered. The difference value D between the
pixel of the original image I and the distorted one (that suffered geometric distortions),
I’, is defined by:
D(i, j) = I ′(i, j)− I(i, j) (5.2)
After geometric transformation, the pixel (i,j) is shifted to the position (i+∆i, j +
∆j). ∆i and ∆j correspond to the geometric distortions magnitude.
The authors consider gamma tweaking (γp) and gamma correction (γs) as non–linear
phenomena affecting the pixels value. After gamma tweaking, the light brightness B can
be written as
B = I(i, j)γp (5.3)
While scanning, gamma correction is performed on B. Thus
I ′(i, j) = I(i, j)
γp
γs (5.4)
Zhang at al. add random noise N to their model and obtain the following final expression
forD :
Di,j = I
′(i, j)− I(i, j) = I(i−∆i, j −∆j) γpγs +N − I(i, j) (5.5)
While γp > γs the geometric distortions are amplified and D is distributed in the entire
image. The solution to this problem proposed in the paper is to add down–sampling
operation to obtain low–resolution. First the original image is down–sampled by k :
Iw(i, j) =
∑k
x,y=1 I[(i− 1) ∗ k + x, (j − 1) ∗ k + y]
k2
(5.6)
The same operation is applied on the scanned image I’. By down–sampling, the effect on
the image of the non–linear geometric distortions is reduced in the ratio by k2.
5.4.2 Statistical Models of the Print–and–Scan Chain
Few attempts have been made to develop statistical models of the print–and–scan chan-
nel. In fact the main references in this regard are [Amiri 2009, Degara-Quintela 2003,
Lin 1999b, Malvido 2006, Villán 2005, Voloshynovskiy 2004, Kundu 2006]. The most de-
tailed of these is [Malvido 2006], which takes into account digital cameras as well as
scanners on the image acquisition side. Lin and Chang [Lin 1999b] propose a model con-
sidering both pixel value distortion and geometric distortion. [Villán 2005] presents
a simpler model with fewer parameters to be estimated. Similar with [Amiri 2009,
Degara-Quintela 2003], the channel is modeled as a non–linear transformation and ad-
ditive, image–dependent noise. [Kundu 2006] propose a tuning mechanism to measure
print–and–scan transformation which can correlate the image before printing and the
one obtained after scanning.
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5.4.2.1 Lin and Chang Model
Lin and Chang [Lin 1999b] outline the properties of the print–and–scan process and
propose a model. The authors consider that the distortions introduced in the print–and–
scan process can be divided into two categories:
1) pixel value distortions caused by luminance fluctuations, contrast modifications, gamma
correction, chrominance variations, and blurring. These are distortions perceptible
to HVS;
2) geometric distortions consisting in rotation, scaling, cropping (RSC). These kinds of
distortions may not always be perceptible to the HVS, but introduce modifications
in the image and thus cause problems in image authentication;
Lin and Chang distinguish RSC from RST used in pattern recognition, as by using
image processing Graphical User Interface (GUI)’s it is possible to scan only a portion of
arbitrary size from the original image.
They propose a model of the pixel value distortions under the print–and–scan attack
focussing on luminance, as this is where information embedding is to take place.
Pixel value distortion Model
Assume there is a virtual, continuous finite support image, I, which is reconstructed
from the original image I0:
I(x, y) =
{ ∑∑
I0[n1, n2]δ(x− n1X0, y − n2Y0), x ∈ [−X12 , X12 ], y ∈ [−Y12 , Y12 ]
0 otherwise
(5.7)
where X0 and Y0 are the inverse of dots per inch values in directions x and y, and X1
and Y1 are the bounds of the image support. The printed image is a dithered version of
I, with additional noise. The scanned image I ′ is modeled as
I ′(x, y) = K[I(x, y) ∗ τ1(x, y) + (I(x, y) ∗ τ2(x, y)) ·N1] · s(x, y) (5.8)
where K is the responsivity of the detector defined in 5.9, s is the sampling function, N1
is a white gaussian noise with a higher power near the edges, τ1 is the scanner’s optical
point spread function, and τ2 respectively a high–pass filter employed to enhance the
higher noise variance near the edges.
K(x) = α(x− βx)γ + βK +N2(x) (5.9)
where N2 represents the thermal and dark current noise. The other terms of the equa-
tion represent the combined AC, DC and gamma adjustments in the printer and scan-
ner [Lin 1999b].
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Geometric distortions Model
In the print–and–scan process, images are discretized at both ends of the process while
in the intermediate stages they are continuous [Lin 1999b]. For this reason, Lin et al.
propose a continuous–domain definition of geometric distortions. The distorted image IG
is represented as:
IG = GI (5.10)
where G is the geometric distortion operator (single or multiple RSC).
5.4.2.2 Villan Model
In [Villán 2005] a simpler model of the channel is proposed:
Y = φ(X) + Z(X) (5.11)
where X is the gray value of the input image, Y is the gray value of the output image, φ(.)
is a non-linear function and Z is a noise modeled by a GGD with parameters depending
on X. In practice, the model is fitted by putting each gray–scale value through the
channel multiple times and estimating φ(X) as the conditional mean µY |X .
(a)
Figure 5.6
The empirical estimate of µY |X is different for each combination of printer and scanner.
For some combinations, the mapping is sigmoidal, with a variance σY |X that is bell–
shaped. By approximating Φ with the appropriately chosen functions and by using a
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(b)
(c)
Figure 5.6: Lena image: a) original image; b) after the model of [Villán 2005]; c) after
print–and–scan process.
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shape parameter of 1.5 in the GGD, we obtain the result shown in Fig. 5.6 on the Lena
image.
5.4.2.3 Degara–Quintela Model
In the context of 2D bar codes, a print–and–scan model is proposed in [Degara-Quintela 2003]
and enhanced in [Malvido 2006] [Villán 2005]. The basic model takes the following form
(Fig. 5.7). Let u(x, y) be the pixel value and v(x, y) be the distorted pixel value.
Figure 5.7: Print–and–scan model proposed in [Degara-Quintela 2003].
Then
v(x, y) = g(w(x, y)) + η(x, y) (5.12)
w(x, y) = u(x, y) ∗ h(x, y) (5.13)
η(x, y) = f(g(w(x, y)))η1(x, y) + η2(x, y) (5.14)
The linear filter h(·)accounts for the blurring caused by the low–pass filtering in the
printer (ηp) and scanner (ηs)
h(x, y) = τp(x, y) ∗ τs(x, y) (5.15)
The functions f(·) and g(·) are nonlinear. The response of the image detector, g(·),
is:
g(w) = αwβ (5.16)
where α and β are device–dependent parameters.
The term η(·) in 3.11. is an additive noise composed by an image–dependent random
component and by image–independent random component (3.13.). η1(x, y) and η2(x, y)
are the CCD noise (Poisson noise) and thermal noise, which may be modeled as Gaussian
white noise.
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5.4.2.4 Amiri and Jamzad Model
The model in [Amiri 2009] empirically estimates noise as image–dependent and image–
independent noise of the print–and–scan channel . Similarly to [Villán 2005], in order to
estimate the image dependent noise, the effect of print–and–scan on different gray levels
and for different γ values is analyzed. They set the mean and variance of the image–
dependent noise to depend on the gray level and the gamma correction parameter and
find that the image–dependent noise can be modeled by a Gaussian distribution with
parameters that depend on the gray level value. Similarly to [Degara-Quintela 2003],
they fit the parameters with polynomials.
For the image–independent noise, Amiri and Jamzad print and scan N times different
constant gray level images by defining the difference between two print and scan versions
of the same image as noise. They model the image–independent noise by empirical fitting
of a logistic distribution to the observed noise.
Finally, to account for the influence of neighbouring pixels on the pixel value (because
of dot gain, for instance), a classifier is designed to distinguish classes of the images based
on their complexity. For each class a neural network is trained in order to obtain the
image resulting from neighbour influence. The network’s input is provided by the pixel
values of the neighbours and the output is the deduced modified pixel value.
5.4.2.5 Kundu Model
Kundu et al. propose in [Kundu 2006] a tuning mechanism to model the print–and–scan
process (Fig. 5.8). The model is described by a simple equation:
Yi = T (Xi) (5.17)
where Xi, Yi is the pixel gray value before printing, respectively the pixel gray value after
scanning and i is the gray value (i = ¯0, ..., 255).
T1 and T2 from Fig. 5.8 are transformations that have taken place when passing from
halftoning to printing and printing to scanning. The total transformation function T is
defined as the convolution of T1 and T2.
The authors estimate the function T by experimenting on a synthetic image with
different strips of known gray levels (from 0 to 255). The image is halftoned by using a
halftoning technique similar to the one used in [Yu 2005] and then printed. The printed
image is scanned in order to produce the corresponding image output. The gray level
values of the scanned image are different from those of the original image because of T1
and T2 transforms. Kundu and colleagues estimated the function T by using polynomial
interpolation:
Yi =
r∑
j=0
ajX
j
i , i = 0, ..., 255 (5.18)
where aj are the polynomial coefficients.
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Figure 5.8: Print–and–scan model proposed by Kundu et al.
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter presents the complex process of printing–and–scanning. The printing and
scanning devices were described and divided into main categories. The laser printers,
in comparison with ink jet printers are faster, have a better printing resolution, with
a lower cost per sheet and do not need special paper like the thermal ones. The most
common image scanners, flat bed scanners, have high scanning resolution, are inexpensive
and faster. Nowadays they are employed in most graphic–arts operations. The main
distortions present in the print–and–scan process were also described.
Mathematical expressions that model the print–and–scan process were introduced.
Two important observations can be made: 1) most of the work in this domain has focused
on finding different spaces that are robust to print–and–scan noise; 2) few statistical
print–and–scan models were developed by researchers.
87

Chapter 6
ICA based hashing and
Print–and–Scan Channel
6.1 Introduction
This chapter analyzes the effects of the scanner noise on the printed image. First the
experimental print–scan chain is presented in section 6.2. Next, two types of noise,
halftoning and scan noise, present in the process are described in section 6.3. In subsection
6.3.3 a model for scan noise is illustrated. The different types of noises present in the
scan process are experimentally identified. The experimental results presented in section
6.4 show robustness to the print–scan process. The genuine and impostors distributions
are quite well separated. The system performance is tested for the two architectures
described in chapter 4 and for different ICA algorithms presented in chapter 4.
6.2 Print and Scan Chain
The print–scan chain used for the experiments is presented in Fig. 6.1. The physical
transformation from the digital image to the printed image is performed by printing
it with a HP LaserJet P3005dn printer [Haas 2009]. Once the image is printed on
the document, the rightful owner can make use of it to prove his identity and access
secured areas. In the case of loss or theft of the document, unscrupulous individuals can
take advantage and modify the content of the image or make unauthorized copies. The
fraudulent copies can be then rescanned and reprinted at a high quality resolution on a
new document. At a certain point in time, the original image, the unauthorized copy
of the image or the modified image, is scanned when passing the document through a
verification system, using a specific scanner device – here a HP ScanJet 3600. Thus, the
image can be recovered in order to analyze it and to identify whether it is authentic or
not (in this way the authenticity of each document containing an image can be verified).
It would be helpful to specifically predict the effects of the scan process in order to decide
if the image is authentic or is a malicious copy.
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Figure 6.1: The print–and–scan chain..
6.3 Noises
As seen in chapter 5, in the print–scan process many factors contribute to image distor-
tion. In this section I will focus my attention only on haltoning and scan noise.
6.3.1 Haltoning
Halftoning is an important source of noise in the print–and–scan process. It plays a
significant role in the image reproduction process due to the limited number of colors in
the printing device. The digital grayscale images use a palette of 256 different shadows
of gray, while the black and white printing devices are restricted to only one color, i.e.
black, and should somehow represent the 256 different gray levels only by placing black
dots on a white paper. By the process of printing or not printing black marks, the original
continuos image is transformed into a binary image (a bitmap, containing only 1’s and
0’s– the value 1 stands for printing a black dot, while 0 for leaving the space empty). This
conversion from a continuous–tone image to a bitmap representation is called Halftoning
or Screening [Vikas 2005]. Since the human eye acts like a low–pass filter, the printed
and not–printed black marks are blurred, creating thus the impression of continuous–
tones of gray (Fig. 6.2). Depending on the printed dots distribution, different degrees
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Figure 6.2: Gray–scale ID photograph reproduced as a halftone.
of image fidelity can be achieved. Randomly arranged and isolated dots lead to high
quality images according to the human visual system [Lau 2008] by preserving fine details
and sharp edges. An important issue is that not all the printing devices are capable to
reproduce isolated dots; they introduce printing artifacts which contribute to degrade the
details that the dot distribution should usually preserve. For this reason, many printing
devices make patterns of cluster dots. The purpose is to find the propitious distribution
of dots for a specific device and to generate the patterns efficiently in order to minimize
the visibility of the artifacts.
The most natural way of halftoning is to represent image parts by a halftone screen
(halftone cell). Each such halftone cell contains a number of smaller dots known as
microdots. In Fig. 6.6, two 8x8 halftone cells representing two different gray level tones
are shown. The halftone cell on the left side illustrates a gray tone of 4/64 (2x2 black
microdots from a total of 64 microdots), while the halftone cell on the right a 25/64. For
an 8x8 halftone cell a total number of 65 gray tones can be obtained by using the relation
given in 6.1.
Let us recall that the number of microdots in an area of a square inch is defined as
dots per inch (DPI )– considered the printing resolution – and the number of halftone
cells in a square inch of area is defined as Lines Per Inch (LPI) – being considered the
screen frequency. As it can be seen in Fig. 6.3, for a constant number of dpi the quality
of the image differs when tuning the number of lpi.
number of gray tones =
dpi
lpi
+ 1 (6.1)
Beside lpi, other factors like dot shape and angle can be modified in order to ob-
tain a better quality of the printed image. In Fig. 6.4 dot clusters vary in both size
and shape according to the gray tone [Lau 2008] while in Fig. 6.5 it is in size and an-
gle. The most common dot shapes are round, square, and elliptical [Coudray 1996] and
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(a) 20 lpi (b) 60 lpi
(c) 100 lpi (d) 140 lpi
Figure 6.3: Halftoned images for a constant print resolution of 300 dpi screen frequency.
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(a) Round (b) Square
(c) Line (d) Diamond
Figure 6.4: Different dot shapes for halftoning.
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(a) 30 degrees (b) 60 degrees
(c) 90 degrees (d) 120 degrees
Figure 6.5: Different angles for the dots.
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Figure 6.6: Two halftone cells: a) 4/64 gray level; b) 25/64 gray level.
directional artifacts are less noticeable for the human visual system at an angle of 45
degrees [Campbell 1996].
The different halftoning methods that exist in the literature can be mainly classi-
fied into three categories: amplitude modulation methods (AM), frequency modulation
methods (FM), and AM – FM hybrid methods.
6.3.1.1 AM Halftoning
AM halftoning methods represent different shades of gray by a regular pattern of clustered
dots with different size. The dark gray shades are represent by large clusters while the
light gray shades by small ones as shown in Fig. 6.7. These type of techniques present the
advantage of low computation, good print stability and resistance to artifacts [He 2004]
but they are not robust to moiré effect.
Figure 6.7: Halftoned images for a constant print resolution of 300 dpi screen frequency.
Some of the most used AM methods are described below.
a) table halftoning consists in replacing small parts of the original image by their asso-
ciated halftone cell [Ekdemir 2011]. Let us assume that each 2x2 pixel area is to
be replaced by a 8x8 halftone cell. Since the size of the halftone cell is 8x8, only 65
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different gray shades can be obtained. The mean gray value of the 2x2 pixel region
is replaced by the corresponding gray tone candidate as shown in Fig. 6.8.
Figure 6.8: Table halftoning example. Each 2x2 submatrix in the original image is
replaced by a 8x8 halftone cell. Since the table size is 8x8, 65 different gray levels can be
represented.
b) threshold halftoning consists in using a threshold matrix t which is tiled over the
image. Each pixel value at position (i,j) is compared with the same position value
in matrix t as summarized in equation 6.2. The pixel value from the original O is
replaced in the halftoned image H with a 0 (empty dot), respectively an 1 (black
dot), if the value is greater, respectively smaller, than the threshold.
H(i, j) =
{
1 if I(i, j) ≥ t(i, j)
0 otherwise
(6.2)
c) ordered dithering is a significant threshold technique. The ordered dither methods
can be divided into two groups: pattern dithering and diffusion dithering.
In pattern dithering the consecutive thresholds are located in spatial proximity [Ekdemir 2011]
producing in the halftoned image clustered dots in the center of the halftone cells
(Fig. 6.9 a)). In this approach a trade–off between the number of gray levels and
the resolution is required. In the diffusion dithering technique, the consecutive
thresholds are dispersed leading to dispersed dots in the halftone cells (see Fig.
6.9 b)). In comparison with the other method, here there is no need to take into
account the trade–off between the number of gray levels and the resolution.
6.3.1.2 FM Halftoning
In FM halftoning the different shades of gray are represented by modulating the frequency
and keeping the dot size invariant. These methods typically have higher spatial resolution
and resistance to moiré effects [He 2004] than the previous ones.
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Figure 6.9: Halftoned image by a) pattern dither and b) diffusion dither. Improved detail
rendition is obtained by applying the latter technique.
A well known FM technique is error–diffusion. Each of the original image pixels are
quantized to either 1 or 0 by a neighborhood operation (Fig. 6.10). The value of the
output pixel is not dependent only on the input pixel, but on a neighborhood of the input
pixel. In order to decide whether a pixel from the original image I has to be printed or
not, the pixel is compared with the print threshold T. If the value is higher or smaller
than the threshold a 1 or a 0 is placed in the halftoned image O in order to suggest
if the pixel has to be printed or not. Since the halftoned image has binary values and
the original image continuous ones, an error is detected. The error e is computed as the
difference between the desired output at that position and the printed level. The error is
then distributed to the pixels that have to be printed as decided by the error filter.
Figure 6.10: Error–diffusion halftoning scheme.
6.3.1.3 AM–FM Hybrids
Nowadays, some printers achieve resolutions larger than 1 200 dpi, the limits of FM
halftoning have also been reached, just as AM’s was in 1990 before the introduction of
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low–cost color. Researchers, therefore, begin to look at AM–FM hybrids producing dot
clusters that vary, according to tone, in both their size and spacing [Aoki 1998, Lau 1998].
When considering the reproduction of monochrome images, AM-FM hybrids are, in gen-
eral, capable of producing patterns with lower visibility (higher spatial resolution) com-
pared to AM and, if stochastic, do so without a periodic structure adding an artificial
texture to the printed image. With some amount of clustering, these halftones are easier
to print reliably and with little variation in the resulting tone.
6.3.2 Scanning Noise
In the scanning process of converting a printed image into a digital version of that image,
various factors have influence on the acquisition process. In the scanning procedure, each
image to be scanned is placed on the scanner’s flatbed and if it is not placed correctly,
the image can suffer a mild rotation. The rotation angle is usually smaller than 3 degrees
since the corner of the image to be scanned can be aligned with the corner of the flatbed
with a proper accuracy [Solanki 2005].
Another important process that occurs during scanning is gamma correction. Scanned
images are stored into a computer and displayed on a monitor. It is known that every
computer monitor has an intensity to voltage response curve, which is a power function
with parameter γ meaning that if a message is sent to a computer monitor specifying
that a certain pixel should have an intensity equal to x, the monitor will display a pixel
with an intensity equal to xγ. The most common gamma value is 2.2, which means that
the intensity value displayed will be less than the one we wanted. In order to have a
correctly displayed scanned image on a monitor, the image data generated at the scanner
is “gamma corrected” (i.e. raised to a power 1/γ).
These factors are deterministic and can either be controlled by the user (like scanner
resolution) or corrected (like geometrical distortions and gamma correction). A significant
damage on the scanned image is caused by random factors. In the case of our application,
it is helpful to know the noise statistics in order to correctly design the feature vectors
and to improve the authentication performance.
When digitizing a wedged document with a flatbed scanner, as here, the principal
sources of noise are the CCD and the carriage motor. Several types of noises are depicted
at CCD level [Baier , Kodak 2005]:
1. The shot noise, also known as statistical or Poisson noise, defines the fluctuation of
the number of photons detected by the CCD cells, during the exposure time, that
varies according to a Poisson distribution. The shot noise is an inherent physical
limitation of the CCD.
2. The reset noise of the sense capacitor that accumulates the electrons generated inside
the CCD cells. This charge is periodically released, in order to be converted into
a voltage by a source follower amplifier. At the beginning of each new cycle, the
capacitor must be reset at an initial voltage. This voltage has random variations
called reset noise. Most CCD manufacturers include circuitry that eliminates this
noise.
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3. The readout noise of the on-chip output stage (the follower amplifier) consisting of
a white noise, generated by the amplifier load resistor, and the flicker noise, also
called 1/f noise, generated by the amplifier MOSFET transistor. The flicker noise
is frequency dependent, while the white noise is not. At high frequencies, the white
noise dominates.
4. The thermal noise, also called dark current noise, has two components: dark current
non-uniformity and dark current shot noise. The former, resulted from the fact
that each line pixel generates a slightly different amount of dark current, can be
eliminated by subtracting a reference from each line. The latter can be only reduced
by cooling the CCD.
From the above list, most of the noises can be compensated or reduced but the
shot noise remains the most significant source of noise. The shot noise is visible in
the white areas of the image, when the scanner exposure-time is short enough to avoid
CCD saturation.
The CCD scan line is moved vertically, down the length of the bed, by a stepping
motor that is pulsed to move step by step. Since the motor precision is limited, the
step length varies randomly around a fixed value. This fluctuation is called jitter. The
mechanical components of the scanner have also a reset noise i.e., at each new scan,
the CCD platform is reset at an initial position which slightly fluctuates from a scan to
another. In the scanned image, both jitter and reset noise generate a noise that is gray
level dependent.
6.3.3 Noise Model
For the same printed image, the binary features vector issued from different scans are
not identical because of scan noise. In order to put into evidence the effects of scan
noise at various stages of features extraction, a series of tests were done at high and
low resolution. First, a blank page was scanned at 300 spi. The gray level histogram
of blank page image is a mirrored Poisson distribution because of CCD shot noise. The
distribution is truncated at 255 because of CCD saturation (Fig. 6.11).
This random variation of the white pixels, ranging between 240 and 254 in the case
of our experiment, represents a primary source of noise in any scanned image.
Next, two uniform gray level images – light and dark grays – were printed and then
scanned thirty times. At high resolution, the histogram of the scanned gray images ex-
hibits a bimodal distribution: beside the mirrored Poisson noise, still present, a Gaussian
like distribution appears around level 80 (Fig. 6.12.a and 6.12.b), very probably because
of toner non-uniformity (Fig. 6.12.c and 6.12.d). The modes weights depend on printed
dots density i.e., on image gray level.
In the dark gray image (Fig. 6.12.d), the dots are no longer separated because of
dot gain, a printing defect in which the dots dry at a larger size than specified by the
printing plate. It increases with the printing resolution. The dot gain contribution to
image histogram is visible in the gap between the two modes. As the dot gain becomes
stronger, this gap tends to be filled up.
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Figure 6.11: Histogram of a blank page image scanned at 300 spi with HP ScanJet 3600
scanner. The white pixels have a mirrored Poisson distribution because of CCD Poisson
noise.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 6.12: Histograms of the two uniform gray images at 300 spi resolution: a) light
gray histogram; b) dark gray histogram c,d) upper left corner of light gray and dark gray
at 1200 spi, respectively.
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Since our algorithm for features extraction is based on a linear analysis of the image,
we consider as scan noise the difference between two scans of the same image. With
this definition, in the hypothesis of an ideal scanner mechanical components, the scan
noise should appear only on the non-printed area and its distribution should be the
auto–correlation of the mirrored Poisson distribution (it is known that the distribution
of the sum of two independent r.v. is the convolution of their distributions; in the case
of subtracting two i.i.d. r.v., the convolution becomes auto–correlation). Indeed, the
histogram of two scans difference is symmetrical with respect to zero in conformity with
an auto-correlation (Fig. 6.13.a). However, its standard deviation is far from what we
expected. Moreover, the standard deviation may vary a lot when other pairs of scans of
the same image are subtracted. For the uniform light gray image, the scan variance is in
the range of [37.45, 11281], while for the dark gray one it is in the range of [85.15, 16383]
(Fig. 6.14a) and 6.14b).
(a) (b)
Figure 6.13: Noise distribution for a light gray image with a) smallest variance, b) highest
variance.
This variation is brought by the scanner mechanical component that introduces two
types of noise: jitter and reset noise. Because of jitter, the dots in the two scans do not
perfectly match (Fig. 6.14c). The result is a supplementary noise, this time in the dot
area, with a distribution equal with the auto-correlation of the Gaussian-like distribution.
Consequently, the distribution in Fig. 6.13a) is, in fact, the superposition of two modes,
both symmetrical with respect zero. Again, the weights of the two modes depend on
dots’ density, which means that scan noise is dependent on the image gray level.
At the beginning of a new scan, the carriage motor is reset at an initial position. The
slight fluctuation of this position produces dots mismatch that may be important (Fig.
6.14d). This mismatch introduces two supplementary modes in the noise distribution,
which increases, significantly, the noise standard deviation (Fig. 6.13b). It is the reason
why the scan noise variance varies with the couple of scans. Usually, the motor reset
noise is not specified, being masked by geometrical distortions of translation type. In our
experiment, it is visible since the printed sheet of paper is not removed from the scanner
plate for successive scans.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 6.14: Variance distribution for a) a light gray, b) a dark gray, c) difference image
of two scans of light gray, f) difference image of two scans of dark gray.
Both jitter and reset noise contribute to scan noise by an amount that is dependent
on image gray level. Our experiments with two uniform images showed that scan noise
is higher in the dark images (Fig. 6.14.a and 6.14.b).
At a low resolution, after resizing at 384x256 pixels, the histograms of scanned gray
images look like in Fig. 6.16.a and 6.16.b. The two modes melt down in a unimodal
distribution that depends on image gray level. The scan noise histogram remains sym-
metrical with respect to zero; its standard deviation varies with the considered pairs of
scans (Fig. 6.16.a and 6.16.b).
The print–and–scanned faces have the same behavior. Fig. 6.15.c and 6.15.d show the
scan noise histograms for two faces, a light–skin face and a dark–skin one, respectively.
The minimum variance case was considered for both images. As in the case of uniform
gray images, the noise distributions are symmetrical with respect to the origin, but their
variances are different. The noise variance is in the range [0.45, 41.6] for the light–skin
face image and in the range of [0.66, 1.13x103] for the dark skin face image (Fig. 6.15.e
and 6.15.f).
By projecting the image on the basis components, the scan noise is also projected.
Fig. 6.17.a shows the histograms of the scan noise on the first IC, in the case of the
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
Figure 6.15: Noise samples for the minimal variance and the noise variance of image a)
(left side) and image b (right side), respectively.
light-skin face (465 noise samples from the 31 scans). The scan noise variance on the 180
components is in the range of [0.012, 0.25] (Fig. 6.17.b).
It is interesting to note that, by rejecting 60 components (from the 240 obtained after
PCA pre–processing) according to an entropic criterion to get the current 180 compo-
nents, 60% of them having the highest scan noise variance (noise variance between [0.02,
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0.16]) are simultaneously rejected. This shows that components with high entropy are
the most noisy ones (Fig. 6.18).
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 6.16: Histogram (a) and noise distribution (c) for a uniform, light gray image;
histogram (b) and noise distribution (d) for a uniform, dark gray image.
6.4 Results
A training set consisting of 300 gray level images of 384x256 pixels was used for learning
the basis vectors. The images in the training set were printed as ID photographs, scanned
and analyzed according to the methodology described in Section 3. For 300 images
a maximum of 300 components can be extracted by using ICA in Architecture I. In
order to reduce the length of feature vectors, the least significant principal components
were discarded in the preliminary PCA stage of FastICA. Only the first 180 components,
carrying about 98.3% of the signal energy, were kept. The corresponding 180 components,
derived by FastICA, represent the learned subspace basis.
For the test, other 30 images of FERET database was considered. Each image, once
printed, was scanned 31 times. This way, a test set of 930 images was constituted.
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(a) (b)
Figure 6.17: a) Distribution of the noise projection obtained for the less noisy components.
b) Noise variance for all the 180 components.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
(e) (f) (g) (h)
Figure 6.18: Four basis components rejected according to the entropic criterion (a – d),
having noise variance greater than 0.02. Four selected components (e – h), having noise
variance lower than 0.02.
The printing stage of the print/scan experiments was done by using a HP LaserJet
P3005dn printer. The images were printed at 600 dpi and 75 lpi, with halftone screen at
90 degrees angle and round shape dots.
A HP ScanJet 3600 scanner was used at low resolution, more precisely 300 spi, like in
some other image authentication in the print–and–scan context [Yu 2007]. The additional
scans were done without removing the printed sheet of paper from the scanner plate. After
scanning, a resizing at 384x256 pixels was done, in order to retrieve the size of the original
ID images.
Furthermore, according to the methodology described chapter 4, the scanned images
were registered to the same coordinates as those of the training set, cropped and resized
once more at 60 x 50 pixels. The eyes and mouth coordinates, used for registration, were
determined manually.
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By projecting the test images onto the learned basis vectors, a series of 180 coefficients
was obtained for each image. These coefficients, quantized on 8 levels and encoded by
using a 3 bits Gray code, provide a 540 bits features vector.
6.4.1 Genuine and impostors distributions
In order to evaluate the scan noise influence on the binary feature vectors, we compared
them by using Hamming distance. The genuine (13 950 samples) and impostor (202 275
samples from the 930 test images) distributions are drawn in Fig. 6.19. If the 540 bits of
the binary features vectors were independent one from each other, the expected Hamming
distances distribution for impostors would be a binomial distribution with parameters
p = 0.5 and N = 540 [Daugman 1993]. Since the bits of the feature vectors are not
independent, the Hamming distances of the impostors can be modeled by a binomial
distribution with p = 0.3335 (the mean of the empirical distribution). The standard
deviation of the binomial distribution is given by
Figure 6.19: Genuine (light gray) and impostors (dark gray) scores for 180 components
and L = 8 quantization levels. The binomial distributions used as models are drawn with
a continuous black line.
σ =
√
pq/N (6.3)
where q = 1 − p and N , the number of trials, is equal to 120 (because the standard
deviation of the empirical distribution is 0.0431). A theoretical curve of the binomial
distribution with such parameters is shown in Fig. 6.19.
Regarding the genuine distribution, it can be observed that the normalized distances
between two different scans of the same photograph is never zero because of the noise
introduced by the scanner. The mean value of the Hamming distances of different scans
of the same ID photograph is µ = 0.1023 and the standard deviation is σ = 0.0344. The
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distribution can be modeled by a binomial distribution with parameters p = 0.1023 and
N = 78, by applying equation (6.3).
6.4.2 ROC Curves
The two distributions shown in Fig. 6.19 are not well separated. An overlap can be
observed in the region of 0.18 to 0.22. This overlap gives the FAR and GAR values
employed to design the ROC curves and to identify the best threshold d0.
Table 6.1: Areas under ROC curves
Area Area
60 components 0.9927 L = 4 0.9981
L=8 120 components 0.9980 180 components L = 8 0.9992
180 components 0.9985 L = 16 0.9906
PCA 0.9944 ERICA 0.9893
L=8, 180 IC ICA 0.9992 L=8, 180 IC Pearson 0.9991
ICA–LE 0.9995 ICA–LE InfoMax 0.9994
FastICA 0.9995
The area under the ROC curve is used as an index of performance in our attempt to
determine a relevant configuration. An area of 0.5 indicates random performance, while
an area of 1 indicates perfect performance.
Our experiments show a high performance for the proposed algorithm: the areas under
the ROC curves range from 0.9927 to 0.9995 (Table 6.1). When tuning the number of
ICs and quantization levels, the highest area is obtained for a high number of selected
components and a medium quantization level (0.9927 vs. 0.9985 for L = 8 with 60,
respectively 180 components). For a constant number of components and quantization
levels, the area under the ROC curve when using ICA is larger than when using only
PCA (0.9992 vs. 0.9948), but slightly lower than the area obtained by using an entropic
criterion (described in chapter 4).
Examples of ROC curves for ICA architecture I are shown in Fig. 6.20–6.22. Fig.
6.20 a) compares the performance for 60, 120 and 180 components for a constant num-
ber of quantization levels. The 180 components curve is superior to the others, with a
behavior close to that of a perfect classifier. In Fig. 6.20.b, the ROC curves for different
quantization levels are shown. For L = 8, a 99.78% GAR and a 0.03% FAR are achieved.
For a lower or a higher number of levels and the same GAR, FAR increases.
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Fig. 6.21, which compares different subspace reducing strategies (described in section
4.4), illustrates the additional discrimination provided by the use of subspace selection.
The entropic criterion achieves high GAR (high sensitivity) at a low FAR (high speci-
ficity).
(a) (b)
Figure 6.20: ROC curves: a) ROC curves for L = 8 quantization levels and different
number of ICs; b) ROC curves for 180 components and different number of quantization
levels.
Figure 6.21: ROC curves for ICA–LE, ICA and PCA (180 ICs and 8 quantization levels).
Fig. 6.22 plots the ROC curves for various ICA algorithms (FastICA, InfoMax, Pear-
son, ERICA) when using an entropic criterion for subspace selection. As expected, the
system’s performance varies with the chosen ICA algorithm. FastICA algorithm has the
highest performance in terms of ROC curve area.
Finally, this performance index leads to the following relevant configuration for the
proposed methodology: FastICA algorithm with entropic criterion for subspace selection,
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Figure 6.22: ROC curves using different ICA algorithms for 180 ICs and 8 quantization
levels.
Figure 6.23: Equal error rate for 180 components and L = 8 quantization levels in ICA
II approach.
with 180 ICs and L = 8 quantization levels.
Due to the monotonically increasing nature of the ROC curve, the optimal threshold
value d0 corresponds to the maximal admissible FAR value imposed by the particular
application. A FAR value of 0.007% (i.e., 7 impostors are identified as genuine among
one hundred thousand persons) is common in biometric verification. For ID photograph
verification, it leads to a GAR value of 99.89% (i.e. 110 genuine photographs are in-
correctly identified as impostors among one hundred thousand persons) and an optimal
decision threshold value of 0.17. In comparison, the equal error rate criterion (equal FAR
and 1-GAR values), gives a threshold value of 0.18 (Fig. 6.23), but the associated FAR
value is more than twice the admissible value (0.015%).
Examples of ROC curves for ICA architecture II are shown in Fig. 6.24–6.26. In Fig.
6.24a), the ROC curves for a different number of ICs is shown. For 180 ICs, a GAR
value of 98.5% and a FAR value of 0.03% are obtained. For a lower number of ICs, for
the same GAR value, FAR increases. Fig. 6.24b) presents the ROC curves for different
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quantization levels. The L = 8 curve is superior to the other ones.
Fig. 6.25, which compares different dimension reducing strategies (PCA vs. ICAI
and ICAII), illustrates the additional discrimination provided by the use of ICA. The
entropic criterion achieves high sensitivity at a high specificity.
Fig. 6.26 plots the ROC curves for various image hash algorithms (ICA–LE, SVD,
DWT, AlgoA). As expected, the system’s performance varies with the chosen image hash
algorithm. ICA–LE and AlgoA algorithm present the highest performance in terms of
ROC curve area, but ICA–LE outperforms AlgoA. For ICA–LE with 180 ICs and L =
8, a 99.89% GAR and a 0.007% FAR is obtained. For AlgoA, for the same GAR value
FAR decreases (0.03%).
(a) (b)
Figure 6.24: ROC curves for ICA approach II: a) ROC curves for L = 8 quantization
levels and different number of ICs; b) ROC curves for 180 components and different
number of quantization levels.
Figure 6.25: ROC curves for ICAI, ICA II and PCA for 180 ICs. The number of quanti-
zation levels for the two ICA approaches is L = 8.
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Figure 6.26: Comparison of different image hashing algorithms: ICA–LE with 180 ICs
and L = 8, AlgoA for 100 iterations, SVD with parameters K = 8 and 25 rectangles of
size 100, DWT with parameters K = 8, 150 rectangles and a Daubechies 4 wavelet for a
3–level decomposition.
6.5 Conclusion
In this chapter the developed method for printed ID image authentication was tested.
The results on real data showed that the method is accurate and robust to scan attacks.
The main sources of scan noise were identified and characterized. For our experimental
conditions, they are CDD shot noise and, from the scanner mechanical components, jitter
and reset noises.
The effects of scan noise at various stages of feature vectors extraction were analyzed
by using ROC curves. The ROC analysis indicates a high accuracy in identifying the
impostors. The index of performance i.e., the area under the ROC curve, varied with the
number of ICs and quantization levels. The more components, the higher the accuracy.
A reverse tendency was observed when increasing the number of quantization levels. The
tests performed for various ICA algorithms proved that FastICA is the most suitable for
our method. As expected, the highest accuracy was obtained for an entropic selection
of face representation subspace. The selection by local entropy maximization allows the
rejection of high global entropy components that contain most of scan noise.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and future directions
Over the past years image authentication and indexation by hash functions have become
an important field for researchers. Such hashes are required to be content–dependent
on the image and robust (the hash should be invariant under perceptually insignifi-
cant/incidental changes to the image), i.e. in applications such as database search,
robustness is an important issue, facilitating image searching in large databases. An
example would be locating an image that is perceptually similar to another one existing
in the database, but with very different digital representation, e.g. a compressed or non–
compressed image stored in a different format. Another desired property of the hash,
especially in multimedia protection applications, is security. It should be impossible for
an attacker to extract or reproduce the hash of a given image.
The main objective of this thesis was to propose a new technique for designing a
robust image hash function for ID photos. The proposed technique can be used in ID
photograph authentication systems, but it can also be used in applications such as ID
photograph search.
Based on the complete analysis provided in chapter 2 of the existing image hash
functions, I have decided to focus my attention, in this thesis, on dimension reduction
techniques due to the promising results obtained by researchers in the past few years.
The proposed method is a dimension reduction technique based on ICA decomposition.
The studied approaches propose robust image hash functions for a wide range of
images, but they are not specialized on a certain image category. It is known that ID
photographs must conform to some specific requirements such as single pose, neutral
face expression, a minimum and maximum size of the head, etc. For this reasons, when
designing a hash function for ID pictures, these characteristics should be taken into
consideration.
In contrast with other dimension reduction techniques, in this thesis we propose to
effect the dimension reduction in the learning stage. The first step of the method consists
in pose adjustments procedure that has as main goal to center, crop and resize each image
on which PCA and ICA was applied in order to obtain the projection subspace.
Next, various subspace selection techniques were introduced in order to retain the
most significant components. The selection of the ICs was done by using an entropic
criterion. By projecting the images only on the significant ICs, the robustness of the
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method to non–malicious attacks such as print–and–scan was increased.
Important contributions were presented in chapter 6 where the effects of scan noise
were analyzed. The main sources of scan noise were identified and characterized. For the
given experimental conditions, the CCD shot noise, the jitter and the reset noise were
identified as the most significant scan noises. The effect of these noises was analyzed at
various stages of the feature vectors extraction.
Personal contributions
The contributions of the thesis can be summarized as follows:
• I proposed and implemented a no–key learning based method for generating the
intermediate hash for ID photographic images. The software was implemented in
Matlab;
• I showed the importance of components selection in the learning stage. I developed
two algorithms based on an entropic criterion of components selection that improve
the results compared to the case when no subspace selection is done;
• For experiments I created the image database from the FERET database by select-
ing only the faces with neutral and frontal view.
• I tested the method on simulated and real data;
• I studied the noise introduced by the flat–bed scanner employed for the experiments.
I identified the main sources of noise and I developed a noise model for the studied
scanner by taking into account these sources;
• I highlighted the fact that the hashing algorithms developed for general images are
not very performant in the particular case of ID photograph images;
• Using this algorithm an image authentication system can be implemented. The
system consists in a learning and a verification stage as presented in chapter 4. The
system should offer good performance in terms of speed and discriminability.
Future work
Further researches can be carried out in different directions:
• improving the method to print–and–scan attacks by completing the proposed scheme
with a decoding stage that will ensure further robustness and also security. Fre-
quently used decoding algorithms such as Reed–Muller [Lin 2005] or clustering al-
gorithm could be employed in order to obtain the final hash value. The clustering
algorithms seem more adequate for final hash value generation and can be improved
in order to increase the performance of the method;
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• enforcing the security of the method by developing a key–based version of this
algorithm;
• testing the proposed method also in the case of image forgery. It is interesting to
see if the method is robust to malicious attacks such as image content modification
made by an unauthorized person;
• testing all the print–and–scan models presented in chapter 5 on the existing image
database and realize a complete analysis of the obtained results in order to see
which algorithm simulates at best the print–and–scan process;
• developing a new print–and–scan chain model based on the existing statical models
in the literature and on the scan noise model proposed in this thesis. It is desirable
to have a simple model which simulates at best the print–and–scan effects on an
image.
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Appendix A
Attack r-value Attack r-value
180 PCA AFFINE _1 3.95 AFFINE _2 1.4
L = 8 AFFINE _3 3.78 AFFINE _4 1.5
AFFINE _5 3.28 AFFINE _6 2.98
AFFINE _7 3.12 AFFINE _8 3.1
WN σ = 0.01 2.5 WN σ = 0.02 1.9
Median 3× 3 3.63 Median 5× 5 2.55
120 PCA AFFINE _1 3.1 AFFINE _2 1.36
L = 8 AFFINE _3 3.3 AFFINE _4 1.4
AFFINE _5 2.8 AFFINE _6 2.6
AFFINE _7 2.7 AFFINE _8 2.6
WN σ = 0.01 2.3 WN σ = 0.02 2.3
Median 3× 3 3.1 Median 5× 5 2.4
120 PCA AFFINE _1 2.7 AFFINE _2 1.3
L = 4 AFFINE _3 2.7 AFFINE _4 1.3
AFFINE _5 2.4 AFFINE _6 2.2
AFFINE _7 2.3 AFFINE _8 2.2
WN σ = 0.01 2 WN σ = 0.02 1.7
Median 3× 3 2.6 Median 5× 5 2.2
120 LE AFFINE _1 3.8 AFFINE _2 1.4
L = 8 AFFINE _3 4 AFFINE _4 1.8
AFFINE _5 3.5 AFFINE _6 3.2
AFFINE _7 3.3 AFFINE _8 3.2
WN σ = 0.01 2.5 WN σ = 0.02 1.9
Median 3× 3 3.8 Median 5× 5 2.8
AFFINE _1 4.8 AFFINE _2 1.7
Table A.1: Results for different attacks and selection criteria for InfoMax algorithm: PCA
and LE.
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Attack r–value Attack r–value
180 PCA AFFINE _1 3.5 AFFINE _2 1.2
L = 8 AFFINE _3 4.1 AFFINE _4 1.6
AFFINE _5 3.2 AFFINE _6 2.8
AFFINE _7 3 AFFINE _8 2.5
WN σ = 0.01 99.1 WN σ = 0.02 1.9
Median 3× 3 4 Median 5× 5 2.9
120 PCA AFFINE _1 3 AFFINE _2 1
L = 8 AFFINE _3 3.9 AFFINE _4 1.5
AFFINE _5 2.9 AFFINE _6 2.5
AFFINE _7 2.6 AFFINE _8 2.1
WN σ = 0.01 2.3 WN σ = 0.02 2.3
Median 3× 3 3.8 Median 5× 5 2.8
120 PCA AFFINE _1 2.6 AFFINE _2 1
L = 4 AFFINE _3 3.3 AFFINE _4 1.4
AFFINE _5 2.5 AFFINE _6 2.2
AFFINE _7 2.3 AFFINE _8 2
WN σ = 0.01 2 WN σ = 0.02 1.7
Median 3× 3 3.1 Median 5× 5 2.4
120 LE AFFINE _1 3.5 AFFINE _2 1.2
L = 8 AFFINE _3 4.3 AFFINE _4 1.3
AFFINE _5 3.1 AFFINE _6 2.81
AFFINE _7 3 AFFINE _8 2.5
WN σ = 0.01 2.5 WN σ = 0.02 1.9
Median 3× 3 4.2 Median 5× 5 3
Table A.2: Results for different attacks and selection criteria for ERICA algorithm: PCA
and LE.
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Attack r–value Attack r–value
180 PCA AFFINE _1 3.7 AFFINE _2 1.7
L = 8 AFFINE _3 3.7 AFFINE _4 1.7
AFFINE _5 3.2 AFFINE _6 3
AFFINE _7 3.1 AFFINE _8 3
WN σ = 0.01 2.5 WN σ = 0.02 1.9
Median 3× 3 3.4 Median 5× 5 2.6
120 PCA AFFINE _1 3.7 AFFINE _2 1.4
L = 8 AFFINE _3 3.8 AFFINE _4 1.5
AFFINE _5 3.2 AFFINE _6 2.9
AFFINE _7 3.1 AFFINE _8 3
WN σ = 0.01 2.3 WN σ = 0.02 2.3
Median 3× 3 3.4 Median 5× 5 2.5
120 PCA AFFINE _1 3.1 AFFINE _2 1.4
L = 4 AFFINE _3 3.3 AFFINE _4 1.5
AFFINE _5 2.8 AFFINE _6 2.6
AFFINE _7 2.8 AFFINE _8 2.6
WN σ = 0.01 2 WN σ = 0.02 1.7
Median 3× 3 3 Median 5× 5 2.4
120 LE AFFINE _1 3.9 AFFINE _2 1.5
L = 8 AFFINE _3 3.7 AFFINE _4 1.3
AFFINE _5 3.3 AFFINE _6 2.8
AFFINE _7 3.1 AFFINE _8 2.9
WN σ = 0.01 2.5 WN σ = 0.02 1.9
Median 3× 3 3.5 Median 5× 5 2.4
Table A.3: Results for different attacks and selection criteria for Pearson algorithm: PCA
and LE.
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Acronyms
ID identity document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
ICA Independent Component Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
PCA Principal Component Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
MD5 Message Digest 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
LBG Linde–Buzo–Gray . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
DCT Discrete Cosine Transform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
WT Wavelet Transform. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12
DWT Discrete Wavelet Transform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
SDS structural digital signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
RSA Rivest, Shamir, Adleman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
VLC Variable Length Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
SVD Singular Value Decomposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
PR pseudo–random . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
NMF nonnegative matrix factorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
FJLT Fast Johnson–Lindenstrauss Transform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
RI–FJLT rotation invariant Fast Johnson–Lindenstrauss Transform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
MT Mellin Transform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
FFT Fast Fourier Transform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
PC Principal Component . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
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